Intrusion Detection for Airborne Communication Using PHY-Layer Information

  • Martin Strohmeier
  • Vincent Lenders
  • Ivan Martinovic
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9148)


With passenger and cargo traffic growing rapidly world-wide, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) poised to enter commercial airspaces, a secure next generation of air traffic management systems is required. Recent articles in the academic and hacker community highlight crucial security challenges faced by integral parts of these next generation protocols, with the most dangerous attacks based on classic message injection. In this article, we analyze the possibility and effectiveness of detecting such attacks on critical air traffic infrastructures with a single receiver based on physical layer information. Using hypothesis testing and anomaly detection schemes, we develop an intrusion detection system (IDS) that can accurately detect attackers within 40 s.


Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Receive Signal Strength Anomaly Detection Intrusion Detection System International Civil Aviation Organization 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin Strohmeier
    • 1
  • Vincent Lenders
    • 2
  • Ivan Martinovic
    • 1
  1. 1.University of OxfordOxfordUK
  2. 2.ArmasuisseThunSwitzerland

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