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A Theory of Higher Order Probabilities

  • Haim Gaifman
Part of the Springer Graduate Texts in Philosophy book series (SGTP, volume 1)

Abstract

The assignment of probabilities is the most established way of measuring uncertainties on a quantitative scale. In the framework of subjective probability, the probabilities are interpreted as someone’s (the agent’s) degrees of belief. Since justified belief amounts to knowledge, the assignment of probabilities, in as much as it can be justified, expresses knowledge. Indeed, knowledge of probabilities, appears to be the basic kind of knowledge that is provided by the experimental sciences today.

Keywords

Discrete Case Dutch Book Empty Interval Dutch Book Argument General HOPs 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Haim Gaifman
    • 1
  1. 1.Columbia UniversityNew YorkUSA

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