Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

  • Robert J. AumannEmail author
  • Adam Brandenburger
Part of the Springer Graduate Texts in Philosophy book series (SGTP, volume 1)


Game theoretic reasoning has been widely applied in economics in recent years. Undoubtedly, the most commonly used tool has been the strategic equilibrium of Nash (Ann Math 54:286–295, 1951), or one or another of its so-called “refinements.” Though much effort has gone into developing these refinements, relatively little attention has been paid to a more basic question: Why consider Nash equilibrium in the first place?


Nash Equilibrium Common Knowledge Payoff Function Belief System Mixed Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


  1. Armbruster, W., & Boege, W. (1979). Bayesian game theory. In O. Moeschlin & D. Pallaschke (Eds.), Game theory and related topics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
  2. Aumann, R. (1976). Agreeing to disagree. Annals of Statistics, 4, 1236–1239.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Aumann, R. (1987). Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality. Econometrica, 55, 1–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Boege, W., & Eisele, T. (1979). On solutions of Bayesian games. International Journal of Game Theory, 8, 193–215.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Brandenburger, A., & Dekel, E. (1989). The role of common knowledge assumptions in game theory. In F. Hahn (Ed.), The economics of missing markets, information, and games. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Geanakoplos, J., & Polemarchakis, H. (1982). We can’t disagree forever. Journal of Economic Theory, 28, 192–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Harsanyi, J. (1967–1968). Games of incomplete information played by ‘Bayesian’ players, I-III. Management Science, 14, 159–182, 320–334, 486–502.Google Scholar
  8. Harsanyi, J. (1973). Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed strategy equilibrium points. International Journal of Game Theory, 2, 1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Kohlberg, E., & Mertens, J.-F. (1986). On the strategic stability of equilibria. Econometrica, 54, 1003–1037.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Kreps, D., & Wilson, R. (1982). Sequential equilibria. Econometrica, 50, 863–894.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Lewis, D. (1969). Conventions: A philosophical study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Mertens, J.-F., & Zamir, S. (1985). Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information. International Journal of Game Theory, 14, 1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Myerson, R. (1978). Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. International Journal of Game Theory, 7, 73–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Nash, J. (1951). Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 54, 286–295.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Savage, L. (1954). The foundations of statistics. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
  17. Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodels mit Nachfragetragheit. Zietschrift fur die gesante Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301–324.Google Scholar
  18. Selten, R. (1975). Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory, 4, 25–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Tan, T., & Werlang, S. (1988). The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games. Journal of Economic Theory, 45, 370–391.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Federmann Center for the Study of RationalityThe Hebrew University of JerusalemJerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.Stern School of Business, Tandon School of Engineering, NYU ShanghaiNew York UniversityNew YorkUSA

Personalised recommendations