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Sentences, Belief and Logical Omniscience, or What Does Deduction Tell Us?

  • Rohit ParikhEmail author
Part of the Springer Graduate Texts in Philosophy book series (SGTP, volume 1)

Abstract

We propose a model for belief which is free of presuppositions. Current models for belief suffer from two difficulties. One is the well known problem of logical omniscience which tends to follow from most models. But a more important one is the fact that most models do not even attempt to answer the question what it means for someone to believe something, and just what it is that is believed. We provide a flexible model which allows us to give meaning to beliefs in general contexts, including the context of animal belief (where action is usually our only clue to a belief), and of human belief which is expressed in language.

Keywords

Belief State Recursive Call Kripke Structure Dutch Book Conjunction Fallacy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

We thank Sergei Artemov, Can Başkent, Samir Chopra, Horacio Arló Costa, Juliet Floyd, Haim Gaifman, Isaac Levi, Mike Levin, Larry Moss, Eric Pacuit, Catherine Wilson, and Andreas Witzel for comments. The information about chess came from Danny Kopec. This research was supported by a grant from the PSC-CUNY faculty research assistance program. Earlier versions of this paper were given at TARK-05, ESSLLI-2006, at the Jean Nicod Institute, at a seminar in the philosophy department at Bristol University, and at the Philosophy Colloquium at the City University Graduate Center. Some of the research for this paper was done when the author was visiting Boston University and the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study. A very preliminary version of some of the ideas was presented at Amsterdam, and published as Parikh (2001). This research was partially supported by grants from the PSC-CUNY program at the City university of New York.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.City University of New YorkNew YorkUSA

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