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Epistemology Without Knowledge and Without Belief

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Readings in Formal Epistemology

Part of the book series: Springer Graduate Texts in Philosophy ((SGTP,volume 1))

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Abstract

Epistemology seems to enjoy an unexpectedly glamorous reputation in these days. A few years ago, William Safire wrote a popular novel called The Sleeper Spy. It depicts a distinctly post-Cold War world in which it is no longer easy to tell the good guys—including the good spies—from the bad ones. To emphasize this sea change, Safire tells us that his Russian protagonist has not been trained in the military or in the police, as he would have been in the old days, but as an epistemologist.

Jaakko Hintikka was deceased at the time of publication.

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Hintikka, J. (2016). Epistemology Without Knowledge and Without Belief. In: ArlĂł-Costa, H., Hendricks, V., van Benthem, J. (eds) Readings in Formal Epistemology. Springer Graduate Texts in Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_26

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