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Epistemology Without Knowledge and Without Belief

  • Jaakko Hintikka
Part of the Springer Graduate Texts in Philosophy book series (SGTP, volume 1)

Abstract

Epistemology seems to enjoy an unexpectedly glamorous reputation in these days. A few years ago, William Safire wrote a popular novel called The Sleeper Spy. It depicts a distinctly post-Cold War world in which it is no longer easy to tell the good guys—including the good spies—from the bad ones. To emphasize this sea change, Safire tells us that his Russian protagonist has not been trained in the military or in the police, as he would have been in the old days, but as an epistemologist.

Keywords

Subject Matter Knowledge Acquisition Propositional Attitude Epistemic Logic Knowledge Operator 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jaakko Hintikka
    • 1
  1. 1.Boston UniversityHelsinkiFinland

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