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How Infallible but Corrigible Full Belief Is Possible

  • Isaac LeviEmail author
Part of the Springer Graduate Texts in Philosophy book series (SGTP, volume 1)

Abstract

Inquirers ought to change beliefs for good reason. What those good reasons are depend on the proximate goals of their inquiries. William James urged us to seek Truth and avoid Error in forming beliefs. He ought to have said: Seek Information and avoid Error. The common features of the proximate goals of scientific inquiries ought to be to answer questions of interest without error and in a manner that yields valuable information.

Keywords

Boolean Algebra Choice Function Potential State Belief State Credal Probability 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Columbia UniversityNew YorkUSA

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