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Population Games with Vector Payoff and Approachability

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Computational Management Science

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 682))

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Abstract

This paper studies population games with vector payoffs. It provides a new perspective on approachability based on mean-field game theory. The model involves a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation which describes the best-response of every player given the population distribution and an advection equation, capturing the macroscopic evolution of average payoffs if every player plays its best response.

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Acknowledgements

The work of D. Bauso was supported by the 2012 “Research Fellow” Program of the Dipartimento di Matematica, Università di Trento and by PRIN 20103S5RN3 “Robust decision making in markets and organizations, 2013–2016”. This work has developed during the sabbatical period spent by D. Bauso as academic visitor at the Department of Engineering Science, University of Oxford, UK

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Correspondence to Dario Bauso .

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Bauso, D., Norman, T.W.L. (2016). Population Games with Vector Payoff and Approachability. In: Fonseca, R., Weber, GW., Telhada, J. (eds) Computational Management Science. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 682. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20430-7_31

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