Abstract
In the present paper I argue that luck attributions are structured by points of view. In particular, whether one is prepared to say that an event or a person is lucky is partly determined by one’s temporal perspective. If an event is seen in isolation, at a moment in time, it might not be a matter of luck at all, but when the same event is considered as an element in a temporal series, then it becomes either lucky or unlucky. Since neither temporal point of view enjoys any kind of logical priority or metaphysical privilege, it is not possible to make consistent assignments of luck without first assuming a synchronic or a diachronic point of view. Since no extant theory of luck acknowledges or incorporates such points of view, all fall short of adequacy. This failure matters broadly in philosophy, because understanding luck underwrites a number of philosophical projects.
This work has been granted by Spanish Government, “Ministerio de Economía y Competividad”, Research Projects FFI2008-01205 (Points of View. A Philosophical Investigation), FFI2011-24549, (Points of View and Temporal Structures), and FFI2014-57409-R (Points of View, Dispositions, and Time. Perspectives in a World of Dispositions).
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Hales, S.D. (2015). Synchronic and Diachronic Luck. In: Vázquez Campos, M., Liz Gutiérrez, A. (eds) Temporal Points of View. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19815-6_9
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