The Altruism Argument

Abstract

The second argument against benefit sharing for human genetic resources holds that humans should freely offer their DNA for research out of a sense of altruism, without expectation of reward. Proponents of this argument suggest a duty to participate in research, rather than a right to benefit in any way. The chapter examines this argument by tracing the history and meaning of the term altruism through the literature, distinguishing for example between beneficence, namely doing good, and benevolence, which is wishing good. The notion of reciprocity, as one that is said to encourage if not motivate the altruist, is examined from the seminal work of Marcel Mauss to the more recent work of Titmuss. Solidarity is then discussed as a strongly associated notion, which is widely used yet has numerous and different meanings. Finally the altruism argument is examined in the light of the fair exchange model of Schroeder and Gefenas, which holds that such a call is altogether misplaced in the developing world. The chapter concludes that some form of reciprocity is required to avoid Mayer’s second form of exploitation, which could well be in the form of benefit sharing.