On the (Non)Improvement of an Authenticated GKT Protocol

Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-19713-5_11

Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 369)
Cite this paper as:
Olimid R.F. (2015) On the (Non)Improvement of an Authenticated GKT Protocol. In: Herrero Á., Baruque B., Sedano J., Quintián H., Corchado E. (eds) International Joint Conference. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 369. Springer, Cham

Abstract

Harn and Lin proposed in 2010 a secret sharing-based group key transfer protocol. One year later, Nam et al. showed their construction is vulnerable to a replay attack and proposed a way to fix it. Recently, Yuan et al. analyzed the same protocol, proved that it is also vulnerable to a man-in-the middle attack and considered a countermeasure. First, we slightly modify Yuan et al.’s attack to make it simpler to implement and harder to be detected. Second, we show that the improved version of the protocol remains susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack.

Keywords

Group key transfer Secret sharing Man-in-the-middle attack Insider attack Cryptanalysis 

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of BucharestBucharestRomania

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