On the (Non)Improvement of an Authenticated GKT Protocol

Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-19713-5_11

Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 369)
Cite this paper as:
Olimid R.F. (2015) On the (Non)Improvement of an Authenticated GKT Protocol. In: Herrero Á., Baruque B., Sedano J., Quintián H., Corchado E. (eds) International Joint Conference. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 369. Springer, Cham


Harn and Lin proposed in 2010 a secret sharing-based group key transfer protocol. One year later, Nam et al. showed their construction is vulnerable to a replay attack and proposed a way to fix it. Recently, Yuan et al. analyzed the same protocol, proved that it is also vulnerable to a man-in-the middle attack and considered a countermeasure. First, we slightly modify Yuan et al.’s attack to make it simpler to implement and harder to be detected. Second, we show that the improved version of the protocol remains susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack.


Group key transfer Secret sharing Man-in-the-middle attack Insider attack Cryptanalysis 

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of BucharestBucharestRomania

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