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Human Autonomy and Social Systems

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Cognitive Autonomy and Methodological Individualism

Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 22))

Abstract

Methodological individualism, like many other social and philosophical concepts, is not univocally defined. According to one widespread interpretation, it is a form of atomism that is unable to account for the real nature of social life and the structural constraints that influence action. This interpretation of methodological individualism is rejected because it is incorrect both conceptually and historically. There is no equivalence between methodological individualism and atomism: the latter is a simplistic variant of the former. Two different approaches can be distinguished within the tradition of methodological individualism: one is atomistic, and the other non-atomistic. The atomistic approach, which neglects many socio-cultural constraints that influence the individual, deals with fictional situations and unrealistic hypotheses about human agency (standard economic models provide good examples of this kind of individualism). By contrast, the non-atomistic approach – which is supported by Hayek – is centered on the real historical and socio-cultural characteristics of humans and social interactions, and takes full account of the effects of social conditioning on agency (see Boettke 2012, p. 147). Since the aim of this book is to clarify the real sociological presuppositions of social life, as well as the meaning of Hayek’s philosophy of action, it focuses exclusively on the non-atomistic variant of methodological individualism. While it may seem somewhat paradoxical, the idea that the individual is hermeneutically autonomous (an idea central to Hayek) it is strictly related to the recognition of the importance of social conditioning. The hermeneutical theory of action is incompatible with atomism because the former, in contrast to the latter, considers agency to be historical, socio-culturally situated, and related to intersubjectivity.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The criticism of atomism and mechanist philosophy developed by the originators of sociological holism influenced the interpretation of methodological individualism in terms of semantic reductionism that has been put forward in recent years by some analytic philosophers (see Sect. 4.12).

  2. 2.

    Some authors have stressed that Popper’s theory of “World 3”, which argues that culture is an objective reality that can influence physical reality and change it, is inconsistent with his explicit defense of methodological individualism (see, for example, Pellicani 2002, pp. 51 ff.; Udehn 2001, pp. 200 ff.). However, this view is incorrect. It stems from a misunderstanding of the meaning Popper attached to the word “objective” within the frame of his theory of the three worlds. When he argued that culture is an objective reality he did not mean it is an holistic entity in the sense of Durkheim, and that, as such, it controls individual minds. Unlike Durkheim’s theory of culture, Popper’s theory of “World 3” does not criticize the central thesis of methodological individualism, i.e. the idea that individuals are autonomous beings and that they are thus the causes of their actions. According to Popper, World 3 (the world of culture) does not affect World 1 (the physical world) in a mechanical way, i.e. by determining the actions of the individuals and canceling their intentionality. “World 3” is interpreted by the individuals and affects “World 1” only through the evaluations and choices of the individuals (“World 2”) which cannot be reduced to an epiphenomenon of “World 3” (see Popper 1977). It must be noted that Popper’s theory of the three worlds is related to what he called a trialist theory of mind, and that Popper criticized Hayek because Hayek’s The Sensory Order (1952a, b) defends a monistic conception of mind (see Birner 2007). The analysis of Popper’s and Hayek’s disagreement about the mind–body problem is beyond the scope of this discussion. I decided not to deal with it, for two reasons. First, the debate between monists and their opponents in philosophy of mind is not strictly related to the debate between holists and methodological individualists. Second, I think that the analysis of Popper’s and Hayek’s disagreement about the mind–body problem requires extensive discussion beyond what can be undertaken here.

  3. 3.

    Hayek (1952a, p. 37) notes the marked differentiation between, on the one hand, “motivating or constitutive opinions”, which imply, quite unintentionally, social phenomena, and on the other hand, “speculative or explanatory views” that people develop about such phenomena. As Cubeddu (1995) pointed out, this radical differentiation is refutable. Speculative or explanatory views can be the cause of social phenomena. Consider, for example, the influence of the Marxist theory of society and economics on the history of the twentieth century.

  4. 4.

    Within the interpretation of methodological individualism in terms of semantic reductionism, one of the arguments used to criticize the individualist explanations is the “multiple realizations problem” (Kincaid 1986, pp. 492 ff., 1990, p. 159). The concept of multiple realizations, which is a sophisticated criticism of reductionism, grew out of cognitive science and has subsequently been applied to the debate on emergence in social science. As understood by the critics of methodological individualism, the multiple realizations problem is just another way of saying that, since there are social concepts and predicates that are irreducible to individual properties, methodological individualism is mistaken (for details, see Kincaid 1986; Rainone 1990; Tuomela 1989). As has already been pointed out, demonstrations of the irreducibility of social explanations do not undermine methodological individualism, as the equivalence between this approach and reductionism does not hold.

  5. 5.

    Some authors (e.g. Nadeau 2003; Rainone 1990; Tuomela 1989) call “supervenience” the relationship between nominalism and emergent properties within non-atomistic methodological individualism (see also Zahle and Collin 2014, p. 4.).

  6. 6.

    The interpretation of methodological individualism in terms of semantic reductionism has influenced the methodological debate in economics. Some economists criticize methodological individualism on the grounds that, since this approach is committed to semantic reductionism, it is unable to consider the crucial role that socio-economic institutions play in the economy because socio-economic institutions are semantically irreducible factors (see, for example, Arrow 1994; Hodgson 2004). Other economists (e.g. Blaug 1992; Hoover 2009) argue that, since methodological individualism is committed to semantic reductionism, it is inconsistent with the approach of macroeconomics because macroeconomics studies the relationship between semantically irreducible factors. For this reason, they reject methodological individualism. These criticisms against methodological individualism seem to me misplaced because, while it is true that there are atomistic economic approaches that support a reductionist individualism, there is no equivalence between methodological individualism and semantic reductionism. For example, the Austrian School of economics defends a non-atomistic variant of methodological individualism that is not committed to semantic reductionism (though this school criticizes macroeconomics for neglecting that economic knowledge is distributed).

  7. 7.

    It must be noted that Hayek was not the first methodological individualist to use the concept of group selection. As Di Nuoscio (2000, p. 174 ff.) remarked, this concept has been used before and in a very similar way by Spencer another author who has, unfairly, been accused of being a crypto-holist (see also Boudon and Bourricaud 1990, pp. 367 ff.).

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  1. ESCP Europe Paris, Paris, France

    Francesco Di Iorio

  2. LUISS University , Rome, Italy

    Francesco Di Iorio

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Di Iorio, F. (2015). Human Autonomy and Social Systems. In: Cognitive Autonomy and Methodological Individualism. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19512-4_4

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