Skip to main content

Verification of Various Attack Approaches Against CSI-Based Secret Key in Different Types of LOS Channels

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Book cover Wireless Internet (WICON 2014)

Abstract

Exploiting random fluctuations of radio channel for key agreement has been investigated for several years; however, these methods of key reconciliation in wireless LANs are vulnerable to attacks especially in case of Line-of-Sight (LOS) channels. In the following paper we will verify whether applying antenna arrays with reconfigurable antennas reduces the number of key bits leaking to the eavesdropper by utilizing two types of attack: Nearest Neighbour Excursion (NNE) and Average RSSI.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Shannon, C.E.: Communication theory of secrecy systems. Bell Syst. Tech. J. 28, 656–715 (1949)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  2. Wyner, A.D.: The wire-tap Channel. Bell Sys. Tech. J. 54, 1355–1387 (1975)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  3. Maurer, U.M.: Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 39(3), 733–742 (1993)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  4. Wallace, J., Sharma, R.: Automatic secret keys form reciprocal MIMO wireless channel: measurement and analysis. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 5(3), 381–392 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Ye, C., Mathur, S., Reznik, A., Shah, Y., Trappe, W., Mandayam, N.: Information-theoretically secret key generation for fading wireless channels. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 5(2), 240–254 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Hofman, C.A., Knopp, A., Ogermann, D., Schwarz, R.T., Lankl, B: Deficiencies of common MIMO channel models with regard to indoor line-of-sight channels. In: IEEE 19th Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Kolmonen, V.-M., Haneda, K., Hult, T., Poutanen, J., Tufvesson, F., Vainikainen, P.: Measurement-based evaluation of interlink correlation for indoor multiuser MIMO channels. IEEE Antennas Wirel. Propag. Lett. 9, 311–314 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Mehmood, R., Wallace, J.: Wireless security enhancement using parasitic reconfigurable aperture antennas. In: Proceedings of the 5th European Conference on Antennas and Propagation (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Edman, M., Kiayias, A., Yener, B.: On passive inference against physical-layer key extraction. In: EUROSEC 2011, European Workshop on System Security, Salzburg, Austria (2011)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michał Pilc .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

About this paper

Cite this paper

Pilc, M., Stańczak, J. (2015). Verification of Various Attack Approaches Against CSI-Based Secret Key in Different Types of LOS Channels. In: Mumtaz, S., Rodriguez, J., Katz, M., Wang, C., Nascimento, A. (eds) Wireless Internet. WICON 2014. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 146. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18802-7_25

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18802-7_25

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-18801-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-18802-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics