Abstract
One of the most important challenges related to Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems is security. In this paper, we analyze the security and performance of two recent RFID authentication protocols based on two different code-based cryptography schemes. The first one, proposed by Malek and Miri, is based on randomized McEliece cryptosystem. The second one, proposed by Li et al., is based on Quasi Cyclic-Moderate Density Parity Check (QC-MDPC) McEliece cryptosystem. We provide enough evidence to prove that these two RFID authentication protocols are not secure. Furthermore, we propose an improved protocol that eliminates existing weaknesses in studied protocols.
Keywords
- McEliece cryptosystem
- RFID
- Authentication protocol
- Desynchronization attack
- Traceability attack
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Berger, T.P., Cayrel, P.-L., Gaborit, P., Otmani, A.: Reducing key length of the mcEliece cryptosystem. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) AFRICACRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5580, pp. 77–97. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Chien, H., Laih, C.: Ecc-based lightweight authentication protocol with untraceability for low-cost RFID. J. Parallel Distrib. Comput. 69(10), 848–853 (2009)
Cui, Y., Kobara, K., Matsuura, K., Imai, H.: Lightweight asymmetric privacy-preserving authentication protocols secure against active attack. IEICE Transactions 91-D(5), 1457–1465 (2008)
van Deursen, T., Mauw, S., Radomirović, S.: Untraceability of RFID protocols. In: Onieva, J.A., Sauveron, D., Chaumette, S., Gollmann, D., Markantonakis, K. (eds.) WISTP 2008. LNCS, vol. 5019, pp. 1–15. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Li, Z., Zhang, R., Yang, Y., Li, Z.: A provable secure mutual RFID authentication protocol based on error-correct code. In: Proceedings of 2014 International Conference on Cyber-Enabled Distributed Computing and Knowledge Discovery, pp. 73–78. IEEE (2014)
Malek, B., Miri, A.: Lightweight mutual RFID authentication. In: Proceedings of IEEE ICC 2012, pp. 868–872. IEEE (2012)
McEliece, R.J.: A public-key system based on algebraic coding theory. Tech. Rep. 44, Jet Propulsion Lab, DSN Progress Report (1978)
Misoczki, R., Barreto, P.M.: Compact McEliece keys from Goppa codes. In: Jacobson Jr., M.J., Rijmen, V., Safavi-Naini, R. (eds.) SAC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5867, pp. 376–392. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Misoczki, R., Tillich, J.P., Sendrier, N., Barreto, P.S.L.M.: MDPC-McEliece: New McEliece Variants from Moderate Density Parity-Check Codes. In: Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/409 (2012)
Nojima, R., Imai, H., Kobara, K., Morozov, K.: Semantic security for the McEliece cryptosystem without random oracles. Designs, Codes and Cryptography 49(1-3), 289–305 (2008)
Overbeck, R., Sendrier, N.: Code-based cryptography. In: Post-Quantum Cryptography, pp. 95–145. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Sekino, T., Cui, Y., Kobara, K., Imai, H.: Privacy enhanced RFID using Quasi-Dyadic fix domain shrinking. In: Proceedings of Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2010, pp. 1–5. IEEE (2010)
Suzuki, M., Kobara, K., Imai, H.: Privacy enhanced and light weight RFID system without tag synchronization and exhaustive search. In: Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, pp. 1250–1255. IEEE (2006)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this paper
Cite this paper
Chikouche, N., Cherif, F., Cayrel, PL., Benmohammed, M. (2015). Weaknesses in Two RFID Authentication Protocols. In: El Hajji, S., Nitaj, A., Carlet, C., Souidi, E. (eds) Codes, Cryptology, and Information Security. C2SI 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9084. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18681-8_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18681-8_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-18680-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-18681-8
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)