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The Nature of Intuitive Thought

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The Nature and Function of Intuitive Thought and Decision Making

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Well-Being and Quality of Life Research ((BRIEFSWELLBEING))

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Abstract

In the recent decades, the most prominent theoretical framework to explain thinking concerns the dual process theories of cognition. These theories posit the existence of two separate cognitive systems, System 1 and System 2, that are in charge of autonomous and non-conscious cognition, and volitional and conscious cognition, respectively. The dual process theories form a strong basis to build a structural model of intuitive thought. Intuition is a form of cognition generated by ontogenetic System 1 processes, as differentiated from phylogenetic, or instinctive System 1 processes. Intuition is a form of skilled action, based on expertise. Intuition is a domain-specific capacity and thus highly context-sensitive, generated and activated by environmental and social cues. Thus the environment plays also a significant role in both the generation of intuitive cognitive processes as well as in cueing and priming the existing processes. I will argue, that in a structural model of intuitive thought the environment can be construed as a “System 3” that has direct cognitive bearing to the processes driven by Systems 1 and 2.

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  1. Aalto University, Espoo, Finland

    Lauri Järvilehto

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  1. Lauri Järvilehto
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Järvilehto, L. (2015). The Nature of Intuitive Thought. In: The Nature and Function of Intuitive Thought and Decision Making. SpringerBriefs in Well-Being and Quality of Life Research. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18176-9_2

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