Abstract
The Cartesian conception of mind is based on the dichotomy of external and internal, which, in its turn, is closely related to the classical conception of experience. Therefore, a consistent redefinition of mind in pragmatism requires a revision of the notion of experience formulated by early modern philosophers. The hidden causes of perceptions are replaced by the relation between two experienced situations mediated by habitual action or controlled operations.
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Määttänen, P. (2015). Experience and the Object of Knowledge. In: Mind in Action. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17623-9_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17623-9_2
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