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A Framework for Analyzing Verifiability in Traditional and Electronic Exams

  • Jannik Dreier
  • Rosario Giustolisi
  • Ali Kassem
  • Pascal Lafourcade
  • Gabriele Lenzini
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9065)

Abstract

The main concern for institutions that organize exams is to detect when students cheat. Actually more frauds are possible and even authorities can be dishonest. If institutions wish to keep exams a trustworthy business, anyone and not only the authorities should be allowed to look into an exam’s records and verify the presence or the absence of frauds. In short, exams should be verifiable. However, what verifiability means for exams is unclear and no tool to analyze an exam’s verifiability is available. In this paper we address both issues: we formalize several individual and universal verifiability properties for traditional and electronic exams, so proposing a set of verifiability properties and clarifying their meaning, then we implement our framework in ProVerif, so making it a tool to analyze exam verifiability. We validate our framework by analyzing the verifiability of two existing exam systems – an electronic and a paper-and-pencil system.

Keywords

Security Protocol Cryptographic Protocol Question Validity Mark Integrity Massive Open Online Course 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jannik Dreier
    • 1
  • Rosario Giustolisi
    • 2
  • Ali Kassem
    • 3
  • Pascal Lafourcade
    • 4
  • Gabriele Lenzini
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute of Information SecurityETH ZurichZürichSwitzerland
  2. 2.SnT/University of LuxembourgLuxembourgLuxembourg
  3. 3.Université Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, VERIMAGGrenobleFrance
  4. 4.Université d’Auvergne, LIMOSClermont-FerrandFrance

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