Abstract
There is no doubt that a cartel-induced harm assessment is the object of economic analysis. However, since the economic aspect requires a complex approach to the problem, underlining only harm is too narrow. Even though a cartel in general has an adverse effect on the economy, the integrated assessment of its effects on the national economy as a whole needs to consider both a negative (harm) and a positive, even though minor, effect. Despite the necessity for an integrated assessment at macro (national) or mezzo (regional) level and its importance for enforcing antitrust policy decisions, the academic literature mainly focuses on problems relating to the assessment of harm suffered by individual affected parties rather than on the integrated impact assessment due to poor practical applicability of this assessment compared with a harm assessment. Considering that the assessment of harm is a constituent of the integrated impact assessment it is assumed that the methodological principles of harm assessment correspond to the principles of effects assessment. Therefore, formulation of methodological principles for the integrated assessment of cartel impact on the national economy was mainly based on the methodological principles of harm assessment.
The loss of earnings is the result not of a simple mathematical calculation but of an evaluation and assessment of complex economic data.
ECJ Joined Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder and others v Council and Commission ( 2000 )
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Notes
- 1.
The first set of Roman laws drawn up on ivory tablets in Rome in 451 BC.
- 2.
This indicator was chosen as one of general indicators describing economic development (economic viability) and reflecting the impact of other economic indicators (e.g. unemployment level, investments, etc.).
- 3.
The European Commission (2011) in its Guidance Paper – Quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union notes that indirect customers may also claim damages compensation. This means that in the EU all affected customers, direct and indirect, receive damage compensation.
- 4.
395 US 100 (1969).
- 5.
The impact assessment of the activities of the Lithuanian Competition Council is based on the OFT methodology which best meets the specificity of the authority’s activities and produces conservative estimations.
- 6.
Article 46(1) of the Lithuanian Law of on Competition; Article 13 of the Lithuanian Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Practices of Retailers; Article 6.263(2) of the Lithuanian Civil Code; Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (currently—Articles 101 and 102 TFEU); Judgment of 20 September 2001 in case 453/99 Courage v Crehan; Judgment of 13 July 2006 in case C-295/04 and C-298/04 Manfredi and Others.
- 7.
Green Paper—Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules of 2005 of the Commission of the European Communities; White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules of 2008 of the Commission of the European Communities.
- 8.
Definition of accuracy: accuracy describes the potential of a methodology (an estimator) to deliver unbiased and precise estimates of ‘true’ damages.
- 9.
Definition of practicality: a methodology is practical when it yields a verifiable and transparent estimate within a reasonable timeframe and with proportional resources.
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Bruneckienė, J., Pekarskienė, I., Guzavičius, A., Palekienė, O., Šovienė, J. (2015). Methodological Principles of Assessing Cartel Harm (Effects). In: The Impact of Cartels on National Economy and Competitiveness. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17287-3_7
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