Abstract
We present some formal, interpreted languages, which are based on propositional logic, but have each a new connective with a semantics based on (conditional) probabilities, which is related to the notion of causality. The first one is well-known as meta-language of Bayesian networks; the other two are new and seem to match better our intuition of a causal connective. We provide definitions of truth and validity, as well as some elementary model theory, in particular focussing on the questions: which properties of probability spaces can be axiomatized by formulas of the new languages, and which not? In particular, we can show that desirable properties of expressive power come at the cost of counterintuitive features.
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- 1.
We do not define these notions here, and refer the reader to any logic textbook.
- 2.
These definitions roughly coincide with the canonical ones in Kaufmann (2009), though there are some minor differences.
- 3.
Be aware that we allow both arcs and duals; moreover, by acyclicity, at most one of (x, y) and (y, x) is in E; this makes the following statements unique.
- 4.
By the dual of a DAG (E, V) we denote the graph \((E^{-1},V)\), where \((v,v')\in E^{-1}\) iff \((v',v)\in E\). So the dual is the order-theoretic inverse.
- 5.
We write this quotation mark as it does not really reflect the standard meaning of intension.
- 6.
Recall that in this reading, “because A, B” has to be analyzed as: in general, A increases probability of B, and we have the fact (A at a certain time, place etc.) and (B at a certain time, place etc.). Our interpretation of \(C'\) only covers the former portion, not the latter.
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Wurm, C. (2015). On the Probabilistic Notion of Causality: Models and Metalanguages. In: Zeevat, H., Schmitz, HC. (eds) Bayesian Natural Language Semantics and Pragmatics. Language, Cognition, and Mind, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17064-0_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17064-0_5
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