Skip to main content

On the Probabilistic Notion of Causality: Models and Metalanguages

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
  • 1057 Accesses

Part of the book series: Language, Cognition, and Mind ((LCAM,volume 2))

Abstract

We present some formal, interpreted languages, which are based on propositional logic, but have each a new connective with a semantics based on (conditional) probabilities, which is related to the notion of causality. The first one is well-known as meta-language of Bayesian networks; the other two are new and seem to match better our intuition of a causal connective. We provide definitions of truth and validity, as well as some elementary model theory, in particular focussing on the questions: which properties of probability spaces can be axiomatized by formulas of the new languages, and which not? In particular, we can show that desirable properties of expressive power come at the cost of counterintuitive features.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    We do not define these notions here, and refer the reader to any logic textbook.

  2. 2.

    These definitions roughly coincide with the canonical ones in Kaufmann (2009), though there are some minor differences.

  3. 3.

    Be aware that we allow both arcs and duals; moreover, by acyclicity, at most one of (xy) and (yx) is in E; this makes the following statements unique.

  4. 4.

    By the dual of a DAG (EV) we denote the graph \((E^{-1},V)\), where \((v,v')\in E^{-1}\) iff \((v',v)\in E\). So the dual is the order-theoretic inverse.

  5. 5.

    We write this quotation mark as it does not really reflect the standard meaning of intension.

  6. 6.

    Recall that in this reading, “because A, B” has to be analyzed as: in general, A increases probability of B, and we have the fact (A at a certain time, place etc.) and (B at a certain time, place etc.). Our interpretation of \(C'\) only covers the former portion, not the latter.

References

  • Dehgani, M., Iliev, R., & Kaufmann, S. (2012). Causal explanation and fact mutability in counterfactual reasoning. Mind & Language, 27(1), 55–85.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ebbinghaus, H.-D., & Flum, J. (1995). Finite Model Theory. Perspectives in Mathematical Logic. Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Geiger, D., & Pearl, J. (1990). Logical and algorithmic properties of independence and their application to Bayesian networks. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 2, 165–178.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaufmann, S. (2009). Conditionals right and left: Probabilities for the whole family. Journal of Philosophical Logic. 38(1), 1–53.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koller, D., & Friedman, N. (2009). Probabilistic graphical models: Principles and techniques. Adaptive computation and machine learning. MIT Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pearl, J., (2009). Causality. Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schurz, G., & Leitgeb, H. (2008). Finitistic and frequentistic approximation of probability measures with or without \(\sigma \)-additivity. Studia Logica, 89(2), 257–283.

    Google Scholar 

  • Verma, T., & Pearl, J. (1990). Equivalence and synthesis of causal models. In P. P. Bonissone, M. Henrion, L. N. Kanal, & J. F. Lemmer, (Eds.), UAI, (pp. 255–270). Elsevier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wachter, B., Zhang, L., & Hermanns, H. (2007). Probabilistic model checking modulo theories. In QEST, (pp. 129–140). IEEE Computer Society.

    Google Scholar 

  • Woodward, J. (2003). Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Woodward, J. (2006). Sensitive and insensitive causation. The Philosophical Review, 115, 1–50.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Christian Wurm .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Wurm, C. (2015). On the Probabilistic Notion of Causality: Models and Metalanguages. In: Zeevat, H., Schmitz, HC. (eds) Bayesian Natural Language Semantics and Pragmatics. Language, Cognition, and Mind, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17064-0_5

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics