Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Interactive Governance for Small-Scale Fisheries pp 319–336Cite as

Governing Through Markets: Societal Objectives, Private Property Rights and Small-Scale Fisheries in Denmark

  • Chapter

Part of the MARE Publication Series book series (MARE,volume 13)

Abstract

This chapter explores the relationship between small-scale fisheries and market-based governance systems such as individual transferable quotas. The analysis is prompted by the wide-ranging introduction of private and transferable Vessel Quota Shares in the Danish demersal fisheries. The chapter documents both quantitative and qualitative changes in the fisheries due the introduction of market mechanisms. Among these changes has been a concentration of resource ownership, changes in the social organization favoring larger operations with better access to legal advisors and financial capital. Consequently, operators in small-scale fisheries are facing challenges, when acting on the quota market, and in general the small-scale sector is in serious and structural decline. The chapter discusses characteristics of the Danish fishing fleet in relation to instruments and actions available for a governing system governing through markets. The specific instruments put in place to protect and safeguard small-scale fisheries are analyzed and discussed. As part of this, the chapter asks how the introduction of market mechanisms changes and transforms the overall governability of the small-scale fisheries. The chapter argues that social objectives have been marginalized and that this development reduces the overall governability of the sector. Moreover, participation of operators in the distribution of fishing quotas has increased through joint quota companies, guilds and through the flexible and dynamic, but individual, every-day market transactions.

Keywords

  • Privatization
  • Social objectives
  • Market governance
  • ITQs
  • Policy design

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Chapter
EUR   29.95
Price includes VAT (Finland)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
EUR   117.69
Price includes VAT (Finland)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
EUR   164.99
Price includes VAT (Finland)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
EUR   164.99
Price includes VAT (Finland)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions
Fig. 17.1

Notes

  1. 1.

    This and the following sections are based on a reading of the weekly magazine for fishers, “Dansk Fiskeritidende” between 1970 and 1980, supplemented with personal interviews.

  2. 2.

    Legally, a fishing vessel can be owned in Denmark by either a commercial fisher with “A” status, or by a company of which two-thirds is held by commercial fishers with “A” status. A commercial fisher with “A” status is defined as a person who: (1) has Danish citizenship or who has been living in Denmark for at least two years; (2) has been occupied with commercial fishing with “B” status (having an income from commercial fishing) for at least 12 months; and (3) has at least 60 % of his income from commercial fishing.

  3. 3.

    The following analysis is based on official data from the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries (VQS sizes and catch registrations in 2007 and 2011) and the EU fleet register (for gear types in 2007 and 2011). Where the data has been ambiguous (in particular concerning gear types), I have induced corrections based on my personal observations and interviews.

  4. 4.

    A large portion (16 %) was allocated to so-called “Flying Dutchmen”, vessels existing only on paper as licenses and catch history. This could be due to wreckage, but in this case it also represents the early quota trade between 2005 and 2007.

References

  • Andersen, M., & Andersen, K. (2000). Fiskere om fisk og fiskeri: essensen af 77 samtaler med danske kystfiskere om økologisk fiskeri: afsluttende rapport om en landsdækkende interviewundersøgelse blandt danske kystfiskere. Grenå: Landsforeningen Levende Hav.

    Google Scholar 

  • Andersen, K., & Lauridsen, H. (2010). From fishing to speculation. SAMUDRA, 56, 21–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Andresen, J., & Højrup, T. (2008). The tragedy of enclosure. The battle for maritime resources and life-modes in Europe. Ethnologia Europaea, 38(1), 29–41.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arnason, R. (2005). Property rights in fisheries: Iceland’s experience with ITQs. Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries, 15(3), 243–264. doi:10.1007/s11160-005-5139-6.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Bavinck, M., Ratana, C., Jentoft, S., & Kooiman, J. (2013). Governability of fisheries and aquaculture: Theory and applications. Dordrecht/New York: Springer.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Byskov, S. (2010). Fiskeriet der forsvandt: eksempler fra et dansk fiskerierhverv i opbrud 1990–2008. Esbjerg: Fiskeri- og Søfartsmuseet.

    Google Scholar 

  • Copes, P. C. A. (2004). Socioeconomics of individual transferable quotas and community-based fishery management. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 33, 171–181.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dupont, D. P., Fox, K. J., Gordon, D. V., & Grafton, R. Q. (2005). Profit and price effects of multi-species individual transferable quotas. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 56(1), 31.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Einarsson, N. (2011). Culture, conflict and crises in the Icelandic fisheries: An anthropological study of people, policy and marine resources in the North Atlantic Arctic. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission on Fisheries. (2012). Transferable fishing concessions. Brussels: European Union.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Union. (2009). Commission green paper on the reform of the common fisheries policy. Fisheries Commission.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eythorsson, E. (1996). Coastal communities and ITQ management. Sociologia Ruralis, 36(2), 212–223.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Flaaten, O. (2013). Institutional quality and catch performance of fishing nations. Marine Policy, 38(2), 267–276. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.06.002

  • Frost, H., & Løkkegaard, J. (2001). Individuelle omsættelige kvoter – Kort belysning af vigtige spørgsmål for danske fiskeri. In Fødevareøkonomisk Institut (Ed.), Copenhagen: Statens Jordbrugs- og Fiskeriøkonomiske Institut.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frost, H., Løkkegaard, J., & Andersen, J. (2005). Forvaltning af det danske konsumfiskeri. Kbh.: Fødevareøkonomisk Institut.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gordon, H. S. (1954). The economic theory of a common-property resource: The fishery. The Journal of Political Economy, 62(2), 124–142.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Grafton, R. Q. (1995). Rent capture in a rights-based fishery. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 28(1), 48–67. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1995.1004

  • Grafton, R. Q. (1996). Individual transferable quotas: Theory and practice. Fisheries Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries, 6(1), 5–20.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Grafton, R. Q. (1999). Private property and economic efficiency: A study of a common-pool resource. Dunedin: University of Otago.

    Google Scholar 

  • Helgason, A., & Pálsson, G. (1997). Contested commodities: The moral landscape of modernist regimes. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute: Incorporating “Man”, 3, 451–471.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Helgason, A., & Pálsson, G. (1998). Cash for quotas: Disputes over the legitimacy of an economic model of fishing in Iceland. In D. Miller & J. G. Carrier (Eds.), Virtualism: A new political economy. New York: Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hersoug, B. (2005). Closing the commons: Norwegian fisheries from open access to private property. Delft: Eburon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Højrup, T., & Schriewer, K. (2012). European fisheries at a tipping point (Estudios Europeos, no 1). Murcia: edit.um.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holm, P. (2002). Sjæk’len, årbog for Fiskeri- og Søfartsmuseet, Saltvandsakvariet i Esbjerg. Sjæk’len, årbog for Fiskeri- og Søfartsmuseet, Saltvandsakvariet i Esbjerg.

    Google Scholar 

  • Høst, J. (2015). Market-based fisheries management – Private fish and captains of finance (Mare series). New York: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Karlsdóttir, H. M. (2005). Fishing on common grounds: The consequences of unregulated fisheries of North Sea herring in the postwar period. Göteborg: Ekonomisk-Historiska Institutionen vid Göteborgs Universitet.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kooiman, J., Jentoft, S., Pullin, R., & Bavinck, M. (2005). Fish for life: Interactive governance for fisheries. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Leal, D. R. (2002). Fencing the fishery a primer on ending the race for fish. Bozeman: PERC.

    Google Scholar 

  • Living Sea. (2012). Evaluation of coastal fishing scheme, translated from Danish.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mansfield, B. (2004). Neoliberalism in the oceans: “Rationalization”, property rights, and the commons question. Geoforum, 35(3), 313–326.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • McCay, B. J. (1995). Social and ecological implications of ITQs: An overview. Ocean and Coastal Management, 28(1), 3–22.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Ministry of Food and Agriculture. (2005). New regulation (pp. 1–5). Copenhagen: Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ministry of Food and Agriculture. (2006). New regulation – Press release. Copenhagen: Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ministry of Food and Agriculture. (2012). New concentration rules – Press release. Copenhagen: Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nandan, S. N. (1987). The exclusive economic zone: A historical perspective. In The law and the sea: Essays in memory of Jean Carroz (Vol. 2012, pp. 171–188). New York: FAO.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Riordan, B. (2012). Transferable fishing concessions: Plastic dinghies, ITQ’s and wild speculation. Retrieved from http://www.inshore-ireland.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1010&Itemid=1542012

  • Olson, J. (2011). Understanding and contextualizing social impacts from the privatization of fisheries: An overview. Ocean and Coastal Management, 54(5), 353–363. doi:10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2011.02.002.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Rozwadowski, H. M. (2002). The sea knows no boundaries: A century of marine science under ICES. Copenhagen: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea in Association with University of Washington Press, Seattle.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sanchirico, J. N., & Kroetz, K. (2010). Economic insights into the costs of design restrictions in ITQ programs. Resources for the future.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schou, M. (2010). Sharing the wealth. SAMUDRA, 55, 18–23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scott, A. (1955). The fishery: The objectives of sole ownership. The Journal of Political Economy, 63(2), 116–124.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Søndergaard, M. K. (2004). Teknologisk udvikling i dansk fiskeri 1945–2000 (Fiskeri- og Søfartsmuseets studieserie; nr. 16). Esbjerg: Fiskeri- og Søfartsmuseet.

    Google Scholar 

  • Søndergaard, M. K. (2008). Dansk fiskeri c. 1945–2005: teknologi, udvikling og forestillinger om kontrol. PhD, Syddansk Universitet, Esbjerg.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tarbensen, K. (2012). For alle Danmarks fiskere: Danmarks Fiskeriforening 125 år, 1887–2012. Fredericia: Danmarks Fiskeriforening.

    Google Scholar 

  • Torfing, J. (2012). Interactive governance: Advancing the paradigm. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Torfing, J., Peters, B. G., Pierre, J., & Sørensen, E. (2012). Interactive governance: Advancing the paradigm. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Vedsmand, T., Friis, P., & Raakjær, N. J. (1996). The Danish fishing industry – Structure, policy formulation and control of Danish fisheries. Roskilde: Roskilde Universitetscenter, Institut for Geografi og Internationale Udviklingsstudier.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Ethnology, SAXO-Institute, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Jeppe Høst

Authors
  1. Jeppe Høst
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jeppe Høst .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Norwegian College of Fishery Science, UIT – The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, Norway

    Svein Jentoft

  2. Department of Geography, Memorial University, St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada

    Ratana Chuenpagdee

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Høst, J. (2015). Governing Through Markets: Societal Objectives, Private Property Rights and Small-Scale Fisheries in Denmark. In: Jentoft, S., Chuenpagdee, R. (eds) Interactive Governance for Small-Scale Fisheries. MARE Publication Series, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17034-3_17

Download citation

Search

Navigation