Society and Market

  • Jeppe HøstEmail author
Part of the MARE Publication Series book series (MARE, volume 16)


This chapter begins by discussing what a market is and examining the relations between society, state, and market. This discussion serves to broaden fisheries policy design as a social and cultural object of inquiry, seeing regulations as related to social groups and cultural forms and their agency. The chapter continues by examining the policy design of the Danish market-based fisheries management system. The chapter asks what is at stake when a market is introduced and further evaluates the concrete design of safeguards and anti-concentration rules. Rather than a best-case example, the chapter shows that the Danish Vessel Quota Share system is full of flaws and contradictions in its basic design.


Quota concentration Trawling Market economy Social safeguards Quota trade 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Ethnology Saxo InstituteUniversity of CopenhagenCopenhagenDenmark

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