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Eurasian Great Power Triangle

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Great Powers and Geopolitics

Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

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Abstract

Can America afford to compete with two Eurasian great powers simultaneously? It clearly was able to act that way in the 1990s, at a time when Russia was weak and China not yet strong enough. Thus while building up its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, Washington encroached upon Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence in continental Eurasia. Enjoying its unipolar moment, the U.S. was not afraid of angering both Russia and China. This policy of confronting the two great powers is still largely in place to this day. The Ukraine crisis of 2013–2014 has only served to underscore the unresolved antagonism between Russia and the U.S.-led West. The battle over Ukraine, whatever its final outcome may be, will inevitably make Russia less “European” and more “Asian”, pushing it closer to China. To avoid a new edition of confrontational bipolarity, Washington, Moscow and Beijing must strive to reach at least some modicum of accommodation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Zbigniew Brzezinski. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives . N.Y.: Basic Books, 1998 .

  2. 2.

    This is not to say that the Asia-Pacific is Eurasia’s only maritime theater. To be sure, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean are also maritime areas adjacent to Eurasia. However, these theaters do not now serve as arenas for strategic competition or at least the level of geopolitical rivalry found within them is significantly lower than that in the Asia-Pacific.

  3. 3.

    Robert R. Ross. The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century. International Security, Vol. 23, No 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 81–118.

  4. 4.

    The Australian analyst Hugh White makes compelling case that Japan should become an independent great power (Hugh White. The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power. Collingwood: Blackink, 2012, pp. 85–88).

  5. 5.

    Alexander Cooley. Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 169–171. See also Micha’el Tanchum. India’s Central Asia ambitions outfoxed by China and Russia. Oct. 12, 2013. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/12/indias-central-asia-ambitions-outfoxed-by-china-and-russia/

  6. 6.

    Shyam Saran. Mapping the Indo-Pacific. 29 October, 2011. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/mapping-the-indopacific/867004/0 ; Rory Medcalf. Indo-Pacific: What’s in a name? 16 August, 2012. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/08/16/Indo-Pacific-Whate28099s-in-a-name.aspx

  7. 7.

    For example, Hugh White describes Russia’s strategic position in the Asia-Pacific as “tenuous” (White, op. cit., p. 91). In a major foreign policy article outlining the Obama administration vision for the Asia-Pacific then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton failed to mention Russia at all (Hillary Clinton. America’s Pacific Century. Foreign Policy. Nov. 2011. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?print = yes&hidecomments = yes&page = full).

  8. 8.

    Artyom Lukin. Putin skips the East Asia Summit (again) . Oct. 22, 2013 . http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/22/putin-skips-the-east-asia-summit-again/

  9. 9.

    Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman. Power and leadership: recognizing (and appreciating) the difference. Oct. 30, 2012, http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1267.pdf

  10. 10.

    The “Eurasia initiative” aims to make Eurasia “into a single united continent, a continent of creativity and a continent of peace.” (Remarks by President Park Geun-hye at the 2013 International Conference on Global Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia. October 18, 2013. http://english.president.go.kr/pre_activity/speeches/speeches_view2.php?uno = 8522&board_no = E12&search_key = &search_value = &search_cate_code = &cur_page_no = 1)

  11. 11.

    One of the recent examples was the 2010 Thai-Cambodian mini-war over a border dispute.

  12. 12.

    Julian Lindley-French . Pacific NATO? January 10, 2013 , http://isnblog.ethz.ch/uncategorized/pacific-nato

  13. 13.

    Ioanna-Nikoletta Zyga. Emerging Security Challenges: A Glue for NATO and Partners? Research Paper No 85. NATO Defense College, Nov. 30, 2012, http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/current_news.php?icode = 470

  14. 14.

    Robert M. Farley. European Powers No Longer Have Role Across Pacific . Aug. 14, 2012. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/726942.shtml

  15. 15.

    Marcus Weisberger. Panetta: NATO Needs to Join U.S. Rebalance to Asia-Pacific . Jan. 18, 2013 . http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130118/DEFREG02/301180017/

  16. 16.

    Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden on Asia-Pacific Policy. July 18, 2013. George Washington University, Washington, D.C. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/07/20130718279134.html#axzz2ZVASNLIE

  17. 17.

    Ross. Op. cit.

  18. 18.

    Robert S. Ross. The Problem With the Pivot. Foreign Affairs. November/December 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138211/robert-s-ross/the-problem-with-the-pivot

  19. 19.

    Andrey Kurmazov. China’s Maritime Threat. Rossiya v ATR. April 2013, p. 69. (in Russian)

  20. 20.

    Rowan Callick. A Power-Packed Dialogue. The Australian. June 10, 2013. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/a-power-packed-dialogue/story-e6frg6z6-1226660979072

  21. 21.

    Wang Yizhou. Opportunities and Challenges for China’s New Leaders in Building Mutual Trust with the World. Global Asia. Fall 2013, p. 36.

  22. 22.

    Robert Kaplan. The South China sea is the future of conflict. Foreign Policy. September/October 2011. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_south_china_sea_is_the_future_of_conflict

  23. 23.

    Jane Perlez. Hagel, in Remarks Directed at China, Speaks of Cyberattack Threat . The New York Times. June 1, 2013 . http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/world/asia/hagel-reassures-asian-allies.html?src = rechp&_r = 0

  24. 24.

    Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. DoD Sheds First Clear Light On AirSea Battle: Warfare Unfettered. June 03, 2013. http://breakingdefense.com/2013/06/03/dod-document-sheds-first-new-light-on-airsea-battle-warfare-unfettered/

  25. 25.

    Jose Carreno, Thomas Culora, George Galdorisi, and Thomas Hone. What’s New About the AirSea Battle Concept? U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine 136/8/1. August 2010. http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-08/whats-new-about-airsea-battle-concept

  26. 26.

    David C. Kang. East Asia before the West. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, p. 7.

  27. 27.

    Jeff M. Smith. China Comes Around? PacNet #41. June 11, 2013. http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-40a-us-china-new-pattern-great-power-relations-times-they-are-changin

  28. 28.

    Kaplan. Op. cit.

  29. 29.

    Chinese general who threatened US with nuclear strike is Pentagon’s guest of honor . March 5, 2013 . http://rt.com/usa/china-general-zhu-nuclear-876/

  30. 30.

    See, for example, John Mearsheimer. The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia. 2010. http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0056.pdf

  31. 31.

    Dmitri Trenin. Russia and the Rise of Asia. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, Nov. 2013, p. 6.

  32. 32.

    Rex Li. A Rising China and Security in East Asia. New York: Routledge, 2009.

  33. 33.

    The characterization of Russo-Chinese relationship as a ‘de facto alliance’ is increasingly used by Russia’s leading foreign policy experts (See, for example, Sergey Karaganov. International Crisis: Avoiding a Second Afghanistan. July 28, 2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/29501801/izbezhat-afganistana-2 (in Russian))

  34. 34.

    A political-military alliance between Russia and China is highly unlikely in the short-to-medium term, but cannot be ruled out 10–20 years from now, provided the security situation in Eurasia continues to deteriorate.

  35. 35.

    Even before the Ukraine crisis, in 2008, a Russian senior foreign ministry official admitted that China wanted Russia to keep low-profile in the Asia-Pacific as a precondition for Beijing not interfering with Moscow’s interests in Central Asia (Russia and Multilateral Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific. (Alexander Lukin, ed.). Moscow: MGIMO-University, 2009, p. 21 (in Russian)).

  36. 36.

    Asia-Pacific Cooperation and Russia’s Place in the Regional Development. (Konstantin Kokarev, Elena Suponina, Boris Volkonsky, eds). Moscow: Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2013, p. 104 (in Russian).

  37. 37.

    Xinhua. China Focus: China's Xi proposes security concept for Asia. May 21, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/21/c_133351210.htm

  38. 38.

    Gaku Shimada. China wants to set agenda for Asian security. May 22, 2014. http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/China-wants-to-set-agenda-for-Asian-security; Shannon Tiezzi. At CICA, Xi Calls for New Regional Security Architecture. May 22, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/at-cica-xi-calls-for-new-regional-security-architecture/

  39. 39.

    Vladimir Putin. Speech at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia summit. 21 May 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7208

  40. 40.

    A Chinese general, former military attaché in Moscow, was reported as saying that, thanks to the Ukraine crisis, “China will get at least a 10 year respite in its global contest with America” (Vasily Kashin. The Second World: Russia Started the Accelerated Shift toward China. May 22, 2014, www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/683781/rossiya-nachala-process-uskorennogo-sblizheniya-s-kitaem)

  41. 41.

    The Central Powers were one of the warring coalitions in World War I. The two main participants of the Central Powers alliance were Germany and Austria-Hungary—strategically located in the middle of the continental Europe.

  42. 42.

    The leading Nazi geopolitician Karl Haushofer put this idea forward in 1940. The continental bloc concept is almost forgotten in the West, but is well known, and increasingly popular, within Russia’s strategic community.

  43. 43.

    The “stopping power of water” is John Mearsheimer’s characterization of geographic limitations on power projection (John Mearsheimer . The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 2001).

  44. 44.

    Yuri Tavrovsky. The West Pushes Russia Eastwards . Oct. 23, 2013 . http://nvo.ng.ru/ideas/2013-10-23/5_geopolitics.html (in Russian); Fyodor Lukyanov. Real Eurasia . Oct. 25, 2013 . http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4 = 2576#top (in Russian).

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Lukin, A. (2015). Eurasian Great Power Triangle. In: Klieman, A. (eds) Great Powers and Geopolitics. Global Power Shift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16289-8_9

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