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The Rise of the Others: Can the U.S. Stay on Top?

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Great Powers and Geopolitics

Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

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Abstract

Can the United States still remain the leading power? Or are the rising powers in fact reshaping the international system? And if the latter, how might the United States behave under bi-/multi-polarity? While most scholars now agree that American primacy is declining, clearly, a distinction needs to be made: in the economic field this does appear to be the case, far less so in the military realm. The loss of economic predominance and, gradually, the ability to maintain a robust global deployment make it not only reasonable but imperative to rethink American grand strategy. The United States stands a better chance of remaining the leader with significant margins of power compared to its challengers if it adopts a defensive realist approach, embracing strategies like selective engagement or offshore balancing. The United States enjoys a twofold advantage compared to the rising powers: a favorable geographical setting and naval primacy. This implies it can project power from the sea to protect its vital interests and to defend regional allies. The United States should therefore: (1) narrow the geographical scope of its vital interests; (2) concentrate only on regions in which it has no one to trust; (3) while backing regional allies in command of their respective regions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Pape (2009).

  2. 2.

    Primacy and hegemony are not synonymous, although many tend to see them as such. The term primacy means being first, while hegemony means leading. Primacy is a measurable material situation, in comparison of hard power among states, whereas hegemony is a political situation, which is related to the balance of power, but is not necessarily its direct outcome. Primacy is for a state to take, while hegemony is for a state to receive (from other states that would be willing to follow). In other words, hegemony is a question of consent, while primacy is a question of competition for power. See Clark (2009a), pp. 23–36; (2009b)$, 464–480. In other words, primacy is a realist term based on measuring material assets, while hegemony is a non-measurable constructivist term that reflects the willingness of countries to allow another country to lead them. This paper will stick to the material-realist term of primacy, which can be measured.

  3. 3.

    On American potential benefit from losing its unipolar status see Maher (2011), pp. 53–68.

  4. 4.

    MacDonald and Parent define it as “a policy of retracting grand strategic commitments in response to a decline in relative power”. MacDonald and Parent (2011), p. 11. This definition resembles Christopher Layne’s definition of offshore balancing. Layne (1997), pp. 86–124. Further in this paper I will offer how to distinguish them from one another.

  5. 5.

    The vast majority of scholars argue that the United States is in decline. Several “dissident” arguments were published in recent years: Joffe (2014) and Lieber (2012). Another argument that is related and calls for the United States not to retrench was presented in Brooks et al. (2012/13), pp. 7–51.

  6. 6.

    Pros and cons on soft balancing include: Kroenig et al. (2010), pp. 412–431; Pape (2005), pp. 7–45; Paul (2005), pp. 46–71; Datta (2009), pp. 265–284; Brooks and Wohlforth (2005), pp. 72–108; Howorth and Menon (2009), pp. 727–744; Lieber and Alexander (2005), pp. 109–139.

  7. 7.

    Perhaps the most prominent recent study that places geography at the core of foreign policy analysis is Kaplan (2012).

  8. 8.

    Heath (2012), pp. 54–72; Johnston (2003), pp. 5–56. For analyses of China’s view see Nathan and Scobell (2012a), pp. 32–47 and their book (2012b); Ong (2007). For a wider historical analysis of China’s relations with the world see Westad (2012).

  9. 9.

    See data on China’s aging population in: Xiaoli (2011), pp. 2–3.

  10. 10.

    Chen and Feffer (2009), pp. 47–67.

  11. 11.

    Brooks et al. (2012/13).

  12. 12.

    Clark (2009a).

  13. 13.

    On the strategic planning in the unipolar era see Homolar (2011), pp. 189–217.

  14. 14.

    Unipolar momentalists include Krauthammer (1990/91), pp. 23–33; Layne (1993), pp. 5–51; (2006a), pp. 7–41; Waltz (1993), pp. 44–79. Unipolar era advocates include Wohlforth (1999), pp. 5–41; Posen (2003), pp. 5–46. On the debate see Sheetz and Mastanduno (1997/98), pp. 168–174.

  15. 15.

    Waltz (1964), pp. 881–909.

  16. 16.

    Beckley (2011/12), p. 57.

  17. 17.

    Drezner (2009), pp. 7–45. See also Friedberg (2010), pp. 31–54.

  18. 18.

    Steinfeld (2010).

  19. 19.

    Fingar (2012), p. 195.

  20. 20.

    Fingar (2012), p. 198.

  21. 21.

    Fingar (2012), pp. 203–204.

  22. 22.

    Hart and Jones (2010), p. 63. See also Joffe (2014), Chap. 3.

  23. 23.

    Hart and Jones (2010), p. 66.

  24. 24.

    Hart and Jones (2010), p. 67.

  25. 25.

    Dobbins et al (2011).

  26. 26.

    Art (2010), pp. 359–360.

  27. 27.

    Art (2010), p. 371. On Japan’s strategy towards the rise of China see Mochizuki (2007), pp. 739–776.

  28. 28.

    http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-04/china-says-defense-spending-will-increase-11-2-to-106-4-billion-in-2012.html. Accessed 17 March 2012.

  29. 29.

    Mearsheimer (2001), p. 402. Quoted by Art (2010), p. 362.

  30. 30.

    Branigan (2012). In a more general view on Chinese views of American hegemony, see Blum (2003), pp. 239–264.

  31. 31.

    Chan (2010), pp. 387–412.

  32. 32.

    “Anti-Access” capabilities are systems that ought to prevent American forces from intervening in possible hostilities between China and its regional rivals, including improved airplanes and submarines, anti-ship ballistic missiles, as well as control systems with improved range. See Hoyler (2010), p. 84.

  33. 33.

    Hoyler (2010), pp. 84–105; Mahnken (2011), pp. 299–323; and also Christensen (2001), pp. 5–40; Fravel and Medeiros (2010), pp. 48–87; Holmes (2009), pp. 217–243; Pradun (2011), pp. 7–38; Ross (2009), pp. 46–81; (2012), pp. 70–82.

  34. 34.

    Jervis (2009), p. 210.

  35. 35.

    The assumption of peacefulness of the unipolar system is challenged in Monteiro (2011/12), pp. 9–40.

  36. 36.

    Waltz (1993); Layne (1997).

  37. 37.

    Wohlforth (1999); Brooks and Wohlforth (2005); Posen (2003); Lieber (2012); Kagan (2008), p. 86. See also Lieber and Alexander (2005); Larson and Shevchenko (2010), pp. 63–95; Wohlforth (2009), pp. 28–57; Levy and Thompson (2010), pp. 7–43.

  38. 38.

    Layne (2012); Nye (2012); Wohlforth (2012), pp. 203–222; Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Beckley (2012/13), pp. 172–181; Haynes et al (2012), pp. 189–203.

  39. 39.

    Schweller and Pu (2011), p. 42.

  40. 40.

    For supporting data see Wohlforth (1999); Lieber (2012); Kagan (2008). For a critical review of Kagan and Lieber see Keohane (2012), pp. 114–118.

  41. 41.

    Beckley (2011/12), p. 57.

  42. 42.

    See further details also in Joffe (2014), Chap. 3.

  43. 43.

    “The Republican chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Howard “Buck” McKeon, and the committee’s ranking Democratic member, Adam Smith, said they are opposed to U.S. military intervention in Syria at this time. ‘On the other hand, there is much we do not know about the opposition. Syria also maintains robust air defenses that limit military options. Therefore, I am not recommending U.S. military intervention, particularly in light of our grave budget situation, unless the national security threat was clear and present,’ McKeon said.” Saine (2012).

  44. 44.

    Carranza (2010), p. 441. See also Carmody and Owusu (2007), pp. 504–524; De Santibanes (2009), pp. 17–36; Li (2007), pp. 833–862; Pollock (2007), pp. 55–79; Power and Mohan (2010), pp. 462–495.

  45. 45.

    Kurth (2012), pp. 39–59.

  46. 46.

    Fettweis (2004), p. 90.

  47. 47.

    Fettweis (2004). References to Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1997); Sandars (2000).

  48. 48.

    Paraphrase of the title of Mearsheimer (1990).

  49. 49.

    http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf; Evans (2009).

  50. 50.

    Meanwhile, media reports indicate that Russia might be planning to resume its alliance with Egypt: http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/514/994.html?hp=1&cat=666 (Hebrew) Accessed 19 October 2013.

  51. 51.

    Multilateral Research Group, Research Analysts (2012). For a thorough analysis of China’s Security Council behavior see Wuthnow (2011).

  52. 52.

    Art (2003); Barnett (2004) and (2005); Gholz et al. (1997), pp. 5–48; Joffe (1995), pp. 94–117; Layne (2006b); Nye (1991); Posen (2003); Ross (2007); Ruggie (1996); Steinberg (2005–06), pp. 55–72; Walt (2002), pp. 121–154, (2005); MacDonald and Parent (2011); Brooks et al. (2012/13); Haynes et al. (2012).

  53. 53.

    Layne (1997), p. 112.

  54. 54.

    Walt (2005), p. 222. See also Layne (1997).

  55. 55.

    MacDonald and Parent (2011), p. 11.

  56. 56.

    MacDonald and Parent (2011), pp. 13–18.

  57. 57.

    He (2010), pp. 1121–1143.

  58. 58.

    Gilpin (1988), pp. 591–613; (1981); Brooks and Wohlforth (2011), pp. 201–219; Wohlforth (2009), pp. 28–57.

  59. 59.

    See a major counter analysis in Ross (2012).

  60. 60.

    Nathan and Scobell (2012a), p. 33.

  61. 61.

    He and Feng (2008), p. 384.

  62. 62.

    Brzezinski (2012), p. 97.

  63. 63.

    See Garver and Wang (2010), pp. 238–261.

  64. 64.

    Many have discussed the differences between the two major realist paradigms. For instance see Taliaferro (2000/01), pp. 128–161. Also see the following studies, some of which suggest different variations in realist thinking: Brooks (1997), pp. 445–477; Schmidt (2005), pp. 523–549; Legro and Moravcsik (1999), pp. 5–55; Feaver et al. (2000), pp. 165–193.

  65. 65.

    Mearsheimer (2001).

  66. 66.

    Waltz (1979); Jervis (1978), pp. 167–214; Glaser (1994/95), pp. 50–90.

  67. 67.

    See Mearsheimer’s and Walt’s series of publications against going to war with Iraq: Mearsheimer and Walt (2003a), pp. 50–59; (2003b), pp. 4–10; (2002); 2003c.

  68. 68.

    See Friedberg (2011), pp. 42–45, 49–52, 183 [inter alia]; Gilley (2004).

  69. 69.

    Garver and Wang (2010).

  70. 70.

    McDougall (2003), pp. 217–233; Blij (2005).

  71. 71.

    Mahan (1965[1890]). .

  72. 72.

    Mackinder (1904), pp. 421–444; (1919); (1943), 595–605.

  73. 73.

    Spykman (1969[1944]).

  74. 74.

    Stephen Van Evera suggested that between 1917 and 1991 American national security policy was aimed at one goal: keeping industrial Eurasia divided, i.e., preventing any of the land-powers from gaining control over the entire continent. Evera (2008), pp. 12–14. See also Friedberg (2011), pp. 6–7.

  75. 75.

    On the impact of geography, Ross (1999), pp. 81–118 and McDevitt (2001), pp. 101–105. Quoted in Friedberg (2005), pp. 28–29.

  76. 76.

    Ross (2006), p. 392.

  77. 77.

    Henrikson (1991), pp. 182–184.

  78. 78.

    This is a theoretical prediction or expectation. However, Chan (in his An Odd Thing Happened on the Way to Balancing) examined the situation in East Asia and found that there was no real attempt to balance China; moreover, the economic ties with it are only strengthening.

  79. 79.

    Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 114–128.

  80. 80.

    Ross (2006), p. 395.

  81. 81.

    Posen (2003), p. 19; Cole et al. (1995).

  82. 82.

    Data from Nathan and Scobell (2012b), pp. 4–5.

  83. 83.

    Nathan and Scobell (2012b), pp. 15–18.

  84. 84.

    Nathan and Scobell (2012b), p. 17.

  85. 85.

    Nathan and Scobell (2012b), p. 356.

  86. 86.

    Nathan and Scobell (2012b), p. 356.

  87. 87.

    Nathan and Scobell (2012b), pp. 358–359.

  88. 88.

    Kaplan (2012), p. 200.

  89. 89.

    Kaplan (2012), pp. 217–218.

  90. 90.

    Kaplan (2012), p 346.

  91. 91.

    Mearsheimer (2010), p. 381. In June 2012 the Secretary of Defense announced a major concentration of the American fleet in the Asia-Pacific region. Jim Garamone. “Panetta Says Strategy Puts Dream of 21st Century in Reach”. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116647 Accessed 7 June 2012.

  92. 92.

    Mearsheimer (2010), p. 382.

  93. 93.

    Rosecrance (2006), p. 33.

  94. 94.

    Kissinger (2012).

  95. 95.

    Many of the prospering countries in recent years have devoted resources to rearming. This can signal that in the near future the United States will be challenged, although it is obvious that it will be very hard to catch up with the United States. The 2008 crisis harmed all the powers (China and India apparently only slowed down rather than went into recession as most great powers), and it had probably weakened them to a degree that would make it hard for them to recover on American expense sometime soon. The crisis might even strengthen the dependence on the United States since everyone depends on the American recovery. In other words, even if the American economic hegemony weakened (the dollar’s weakening vis-à-vis the Euro and other currencies is only one symptom of this), the U.S. is still the most important factor in the market. Blackwill (2009); Steil (2009); Shah (2010).

  96. 96.

    Davidson (2006).

  97. 97.

    A compelling challenge to the common notion that the current crisis is different than previous stances can be found in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).

  98. 98.

    Nathan and Scobell (2012b), p. 359.

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  1. Department of History Atlanta, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, 30329, USA

    Ziv Rubinovitz

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    Aharon Klieman

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Rubinovitz, Z. (2015). The Rise of the Others: Can the U.S. Stay on Top?. In: Klieman, A. (eds) Great Powers and Geopolitics. Global Power Shift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16289-8_3

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