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Reasoning with Form and Content

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Past and Present Interactions in Legal Reasoning and Logic

Part of the book series: Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning ((LARI,volume 7))

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose a logical frame allowing us to display the argumentative features behind legal decisions. This undertaking is motivated by Hans Kelsen’s solution to a well-known puzzle in legal philosophy, called Jørgensen’s dilemma. In the first part of the text, we deliver a detailed presentation of the problem, as well as two of the many attempts to a solution. Then we present what we consider to be the final solution, given by the legal philosopher Hans Kelsen. Based on this approach, the second part presents our attempts to provide, by means of a dialogical frame, an original application of the kelsenian solution in the field of legal justification. This logical frame not only perfectly displays Kelsen’s approach but it also allows to express, debate and justify the legal reasoning without transgressing the limits between the legal field of normative creation and the scientific field of normative justification.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This distinction will also be important in the differentiation between legal norms (Rechts-Norm) and normative propositions (Rechts-Satz).

  2. 2.

    See [17, chap. 15, p. 420].

  3. 3.

    Norms are not facts, they are the “product” or the sense of an act of will, they are wanted by someone, and directed towards someone else’s behaviour.

  4. 4.

    Here legal validity means the specific existence of a norm in a legal order. For a norm to be valid or existent in the legal order means that all the legal procedures to its creation were respected.

  5. 5.

    See [1, p. 207].

  6. 6.

    This form of distinction can be found later with the neustic/phrastic dichotomy in [6].

  7. 7.

    Dependent on the efficacy of the norm. Ross explains: “[…] an imperative I1 is said to be satisfied when the corresponding indicative sentence S1, describing the theme of demand, is true, and non-satisfied, when that sentence is false.” See [16, p. 37].

  8. 8.

    We will analyse this misconception concerning the validity as a value of the imperative or norm later on p. 195.

  9. 9.

    See [16, p. 31].

  10. 10.

    Ibid., p. 35.

  11. 11.

    Ibid., p. 38.

  12. 12.

    The point here is that the specific norm in the conclusion depends on the act of will of the person enacting such a norm, and this process is not achieved through a syllogism. The judge can enact the particular norm without making use of the practical syllogism.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., p. 45.

  14. 14.

    See [8, p. 58].

  15. 15.

    The original, in French: “Ross attaque directement l’idée selon laquelle la validité, qualité spécifique des propositions prescriptives, serait équivalente à la vérité, qualité des propositions indicatives.” See [2, p. 34].

  16. 16.

    As we remember, Ross says that the logical treatment in a practical inference is an illusion, since the imperatives are actually treated as indicative sentences (because the evaluation concerns the satisfaction of the norm, which is a verifiable fact).

  17. 17.

    See [18, p. 3].

  18. 18.

    See [18].

  19. 19.

    See [8, p. 322].

  20. 20.

    See [19].

  21. 21.

    See [19, p. vii].

  22. 22.

    See Sect. 9.3.1.2.

  23. 23.

    See [9].

  24. 24.

    This approach allows the combination and analysis of different logics in one and the same frame. See [13] for examples or [7] for a general view of these different developments.

  25. 25.

    The overall set of used rules settles the dialog system. See Appendix p. 219 for a presentation of the standard rules of the dialogical approach to logic.

  26. 26.

    Through the notion of winning strategy.

  27. 27.

    See Winning Rule SR-3, Appendix p. 219, §Structural Rules for the definition of the principle regulating victory.

  28. 28.

    See [14].

  29. 29.

    See [15].

  30. 30.

    The “Civil Code” or the “Constitution”. See [8, pp. 61–62 and 81–82].

  31. 31.

    Consequently, the corresponding dialog must beforehand suppose as admitted both the set of norms and a set of facts. This fits perfectly with the notion of initial concessions just mentioned.

  32. 32.

    We will come back later to the discussion over validity and truth, with the justification notion.

  33. 33.

    Thanks to the justification rule that we introduce, this procedure becomes explicit. See p. 208.

  34. 34.

    Commonly known as the Public Announcement operator in Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL). See [4] for a DEL overview and [11, chaps. 6–8], for more details about the juridical use of this dynamic operator.

  35. 35.

    The dynamic operator entails a conditional form, but this conditional form is far from the well-known material conditional. The consequent requires that the antecedent is true. If the antecedent is not true, it cannot be announced and the consequent cannot be evaluated in the submodel where the antecedent was true before its announcement. See [4, chap. 4] 4 for more details.

  36. 36.

    A contextual point is not an atomic formula but it receives the same restriction, P only being capable of re-use those introduced by O.

  37. 37.

    These rules are originally introduced in [10]; soundness and completeness proof of them is given in [12].

  38. 38.

    See [11, chap. 5].

  39. 39.

    The dynamic operator \(\langle \varphi \rangle \psi\), such that \(\langle \varphi \rangle \psi \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=}\neg [\varphi ]\neg \psi\), expresses the same idea but with a conjunctive form. So, in this case the burden of the choice is not supported by the defender but by the challenger. See [10] and [11, chap. 3].

  40. 40.

    This rule is counterpart of the fact that only true formulas can be used with this dynamic operator—what can sound a bit idealized if we consider evidence. An interesting point would be to consider refutable evidence, but to do this we need to use more sophisticated dynamic operators.

  41. 41.

    As discussed in Sect. 9.3.1.2, §“Validity and Truth ?”.

  42. 42.

    Even if we present it in two distinct tables (Figs. 9.4 and 9.5), it is in fact one and the same rule authorizing two different defences.

  43. 43.

    We come back to this distinction in the paragraph “Propositional and Procedural Justification”, p. 208.

  44. 44.

    Normally, the two players do use the same rules, but the formal restriction introduces an asymmetry. Our justification rule allows establishing a strict and complete symmetry.

  45. 45.

    This rule gives a typical copycat procedure, i.e. a procedure identical to the formal restriction.

  46. 46.

    See Sect. 9.3.3.1, p. 213 and following.

  47. 47.

    The set \(\mathcal{N}\) cannot contain conflicting norms. This aspect is somewhat idealized, because it is not impossible for the norms to enter in conflict. The question concerning conflicts between norms and their choice is not of our interest by now, but could certainly be the object of future researches.

  48. 48.

    Even if the set \(\mathcal{F}\) contains \(\neg \mathsf{T}_{c}\) or doesn’t even contain \(\mathsf{T}_{c}\), identical plays will be produced. Maybe this indicates a link between the absence of the guilty proof and the innocence presumption.

  49. 49.

    This is precisely the context where Jørgensen’s Dilemma emerges.

  50. 50.

    Excepted the rule for negation since there is no defence, see Table 9.12.

  51. 51.

    See [3, chap. 2] for a further discussion on repetition ranks.

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Acknowledgements

This paper has been supported by JuriLog Project (ANR11 FRAL 003 01), hosted at the Maison européenne des sciences de l’homme et de la société (MESHS – USR 3185).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Lille 3, UMR 8163 Savoirs, Textes, Langage, 3 Rue du Barreau, 59650, Villeneuve-d’Ascq, France

    Juliele Maria Sievers & Sébastien Magnier

Authors
  1. Juliele Maria Sievers
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  2. Sébastien Magnier
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Correspondence to Juliele Maria Sievers .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Universität Konstanz, Konstanz, Baden-Württemberg, Germany

    Matthias Armgardt

  2. UMR 8163 Savoirs, Textes, Langage, Université Lille UFR Humanités Département Philosophie, Villeneuve d'Ascq, France

    Patrice Canivez

  3. Equipe René Demogue (CRD&P, EA 4487), Université de Lille (UDSL), Lille, France

    Sandrine Chassagnard-Pinet

Appendix: Propositional Dialogic in a Nutshell

Appendix: Propositional Dialogic in a Nutshell

This Appendix presents the rules of Propositional Dialogic, i.e. the particle rules for the propositional connectors \(\neg,\wedge,\vee,\rightarrow\) and the standard structural rules.

How should the particle rules be read?

The reading of the particle rules is straightforward once we keep in mind the notion of usage of the logical constant that they represent. A particle rule can be decrypted via these three pointsFootnote 50:

  1. 1.

    An X’s utterance,

  2. 2.

    A challenge, which is the demanding made by player Y over the initial X’s utterance,

  3. 3.

    A defence, corresponding to the answer of player X to the challenge made by Y.

Table 9.12 Standard connectives – PR-SC
Full size table

1.1 Particle Rules

Before presenting the structural rules, we have to deliver one more definition: that of repetition rank. A repetition rank is a positive integer corresponding to the number of times that a player can repeat the same challenge or the same defence.Footnote 51

1.2 Structural Rules

  • ◇ Starting Rule SR-0 : Any play d Δ of a dialog \(\mathcal{D}_{\varDelta }\) starts with P uttering Δ—the thesis. After the utterance of the thesis, O has to choose a repetition rank. P chooses his repetition rank right after O.

  • ◇ Playing Rule SR-1: Players move alternatively. Each following the repetition rank is either a challenge or a defence concerning a previous challenge.

  • ◇ Atomic Restriction SR-2: P cannot utter an atomic formula first. He is only allowed to reused those previously uttered by O.

  • ◇ Winning Rule SR-3: A player X wins a play if and only if it is Y’s turn play but he cannot move anymore with respect to the rules.

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Sievers, J.M., Magnier, S. (2015). Reasoning with Form and Content. In: Armgardt, M., Canivez, P., Chassagnard-Pinet, S. (eds) Past and Present Interactions in Legal Reasoning and Logic. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16021-4_9

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