Games with Type Indeterminate Players
We develop a basic framework encoding preference relations on the set of possible strategies in a quantum-like fashion. The Type Indeterminacy model introduces quantum-like uncertainty affecting preferences. The players are viewed as systems subject to measurements. The decision nodes are, possibly non-commuting, operators that measure preferences modulo strategic reasoning. We define a Hilbert space of types and focus on pure strategy TI games of maximal information. Preferences evolve in a non-deterministic manner with actions along the play: they are endogenous to the interaction. We propose the Type Indeterminate Nash Equilibrium as a solution concept relying on best-replies at the level of eigentypes.
KeywordsType Indeterminacy Superposition of preferences Hilbert space of types Type Indeterminate Nash Equilibrium
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