Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Disputes on TTIP: Does the Agreement Need the Consent of the German Parliament?

  • Chapter
Trade Policy between Law, Diplomacy and Scholarship

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((Spec. Issue))

Abstract

In February, 2013 US President Barack Obama and EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso announced that talks between the United States and the European Union would take place to negotiate an agreement on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) to create a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA). In March 2013, the EU Commission sent to the Council of the EU a recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations on a comprehensive trade and investment agreement, called the TTIP, between the EU and the USA. On 14 June 2013, the Council (Foreign Affairs, Trade) unanimously approved a mandate to the Commission for the negotiation of such an agreement. On the occasion of that same meeting, the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council further mandated the European Commission to negotiate on behalf of the Member States in areas that have remained within the exclusive competence of the Member States in order to allow for a comprehensive trade and investment agreement. This demonstrates that the planned comprehensive agreement is designed to include matters for which the competences have not been conferred upon the European Union (neither as exclusive nor as shared competences) but remain with the Member States in accordance with the principle of conferral (Article 5 paras. 1 and 2, Article 4 para. 1 TEU). The inclusion of these matters entails a so-called mixed agreement between the US on one side and the EU and its Member States on the other side (see below). Additionally, the Council (Foreign Affairs, Trade) adopted directives for the negotiations on the comprehensive TTIP. These directives contain instructions concerning the nature and scope of the agreement, its preamble and general principles, objectives, market access (trade in goods, trade in services and establishment, investment protection, “including areas of mixed competence, such as portfolio investment, property and expropriation aspects”, public procurement), regulatory issues and non-tariff barriers, including sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), rules on intellectual property rights, trade and sustainable development, customs and trade facilitation, existing sectoral trade agreements (e.g. on trade in wine), trade and competition, trade-related energy and raw materials, trade-related aspects of small and medium-sized enterprises, capital movement and payments, transparency, the inclusion of other areas of law, if mutually desired, institutional framework and final provisions.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Document COM(2013) 136 final (EU RESTRICTED).

  2. 2.

    See Press Release of the Council of the European Union of 14 June 2013, 10919/13, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137485.pdf. The mandate is contained in EU-Document No 7398/13—LIMITE. The directives for the negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States of America were officially published by the Council at last on 9 October 2014, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf.

  3. 3.

    That forum needs to be distinguished from the Council as an organ of the European Union (Article 13 TEU), cf. Streinz (2012), paras. 371 et seq.

  4. 4.

    EU-Document No 7399/13—LIMITE.

  5. 5.

    Council of the European Union, 17 June 2013, Document No 11103/13 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED: Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States of America, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf. The US point of view is published in a press release of the Office of the United States Trade Representative of March 2014, U.S. Objectives, U.S. Benefits in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A Detailed View, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2014/March/US-Objectives-US-Benefits-In-the-TTIP-a-Detailed-View.

  6. 6.

    Council of the European Union, 17 June 2013, Document No 11103/13 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED: Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States of America, para. 22, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf.

  7. 7.

    Council of the European Union, 17 June 2013, Document No 11103/13 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED: Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States of America, para. 25, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf.

  8. 8.

    Council Decision (2001/264/EC) of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council’s security regulations, [2001] OJ L 101/1.

  9. 9.

    See Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Klaus Ernst u.a. und der Fraktion DIE LINKE (Response of the German Federal Government to the Brief Parliamentary Enquiries by Members of Parliament Klaus Ernst and others and the parliamentary group THE LEFT) of 28 January 2014, Bundestags-Drucksache 18/351, p. 5, No. 14, available in German at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/003/1800351.pdf. Problematic in this regard was the refusal of the US delegation to allow the Commission to deliver the former’s negotiation papers to the EU Member States.

  10. 10.

    General Court, T-529/09, Sophie in’t Veld v Council of the European Union, Judgement of 4 May 2012, paras. 120 and 121–125: application of a Member of the European Parliament for annulment of the Council’s decision of 29 October 2009 refusing full access to Document No 11897/09 of 9 July 2009 containing an opinion of the Council’s Legal Service entitled “Recommendation from the Commission to the Council to authorise the opening of negotiations between the European Union and the United States of America for an international agreement to make available to the United States Treasury Department financial messaging data to prevent and combat terrorism and terrorist financing” (Document No 11897/09), based on Article 4 para. 1 lit. a and para. 2 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, [2001] OJ L 145/43.

  11. 11.

    See Article 207 para. 3, Article 218 paras. 2–4 TFEU.

  12. 12.

    See European Commission (2014c), p. 2. Concerning “red lines” see e.g. the Directives of negotiation, Council of the European Union, 17 June 2013, Document No 11103/13 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED: Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States of America, para. 8 (“promoting high levels of protection for the environment, labour and consumers, consistent with the EU acquis and Member States’ legislation”), para. 9 (exclusion of “provisions that would risk prejudicing the Union’s or its Member States’ cultural and linguistic diversity”), available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf.

  13. 13.

    European Commission (2014b), pp. 3 et seq.

  14. 14.

    See Rathke (2014), 3.1 with further references concerning the Reports of the European Commission on the first three rounds of negotiations (cf. e.g. Commission, EU papers discussed with the US during the third round of negotiations (16–20 December 2013), 6 March 2014) and the information of the German Bundestag (e.g. Referat PE 4, EU-Verbindungsbüro, Bericht aus Brüssel 03/2014, available at http://www.no-ttip.de/Material/Kompetenzen.pdf); Bericht des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie über die Ergebnisse der dritten TTIP-Verhandlungsrunde, 16.–20. Dezember 2013, Washington 12. Februar 2014, BReg-Dok 57/2014. See also the answer of the German Federal Government, Bundestags-Drucksache 18/351, p. 5, No. 14, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/003/1800351.pdf.

  15. 15.

    European Commission (2014c).

    (1) Consulting and updating the public. (2) Conferring with governments and MEPs. (3) Getting advice from outside experts. (4) Hearing from other interest groups.

  16. 16.

    See Article 218 para. 6 lit. a(v) TFEU: The TTIP is based on Article 207 TFEU whose para. 2 requires that the European Parliament and the Council act by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 294 TFEU). See Nettesheim and Duvigneau (2012), paras. 46 and 48; Weiß (2014), p. 515 (520, para. 6).

  17. 17.

    European Commission (2014a), p. 2.

  18. 18.

    European Commission, State of Play of TTIP negotiations after the 6th Round, 29 July 2014, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/tradoc_152699.pdf.

  19. 19.

    On 21 January 2014, EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht (on 1 November 2014, Cecilia Malmström took office as EU Trade Commissioner) promised “to publish a proposed text for the investment part of the talks which will include sections on investment protector and on investor-to-state dispute settlement, or ISDS”, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1015&title=Commission-to-consult-European-public-on-provisions-in-EU-US-trade-deal-on-investment-and-investor-state-dispute-settlement. But in its publication IP/14/92 of 27 March 2014, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-292_de.htm, the Commission only cited examples of the text of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada (CETA). See the critical assessment by Krajewski (2014), p. 2.

  20. 20.

    Document TRADE B1, B2/asc/2557028, available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/eu-kommission-position-in-den.pdf. See DIE ZEIT (2014). See also the website of the GREEN PARTY http://www.ttip-leak.eu/.

  21. 21.

    Concerning disinformation by NGOs see Greive (2014), p. 4. See however on the reliability of leaked documents, Herrmann (2015), in this volume, p. 45.

  22. 22.

    Konttinen (2013); in English at http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/8717-professor-finland-s-legislative-power-may-be-in-jeopardy.html.

  23. 23.

    Durham University Lecture, 22 May 2014, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJtfWZGxnGI.

  24. 24.

    De Gucht (2013). See also Parker/Alemanno (2014), p. 8: “Overall, both sides offer the key element of transparency and public participation, but they do so to differing degrees at different stages in the process. Clearly, the EU legislative drafting process is more transparent, rigorous and inclusive of stakeholders in the formative stages of legislation”.

  25. 25.

    Serious critical points are the use of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) or hormone-treated beef, but there also odd questions being asked such as those relating to “chlorine-soaked-chickens”. Concerning the negotiation positions of the EU see Kraus (2015), p. 19 (20 et seq.).

  26. 26.

    See, e.g., Greive (2014), p. 1: Benefit to the Remscheid based SME “Hodura” (different norms concerning toys).

  27. 27.

    The German Federal Government, too, has a very restrictive view on this topic, see Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion der SPD (Response of the Federal Government to the Brief Parliamentary Enquiry by the parliamentary group of the Social Democratic Party) of 24 September 2013, Bundestags-Drucksache 17/14787, p. 2, No. 2, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/17/147/1714787.pdf.

  28. 28.

    See, e.g., Eberhardt (2013), p. 29.

  29. 29.

    European Commission (2014c), pp. 3 et seq.

  30. 30.

    Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The USA is not a party of this Treaty. There was only a lawsuit initiated by a UK subsidiary of the US-based AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/4. The Case Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Federation is particularly interesting. Despite Russia’s termination of the provisional application of the ECT it is (until 19 October 2029) under an obligation to afford the investment protection provisions pursuant to part III of the ECT.

  31. 31.

    There are two cases: 1. Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG & Co. KG (Sweden) v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6. Subject matter: Construction of a coal-fired power plant and environmental protection measures (expropriation), EUR 1.4 billion. Settled by agreement among the parties embodied in an award by consent dated 11 March 2011. 2. Vattenfall AB (Sweden) et al. v. Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12. Subject matter: Nuclear power plant, EUR 700 million. The case is pending. See Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (Response of the German Federal Government to the Brief Parliamentary Enquiry of the parliamentary group ALLIANCE 90/THE GREEN PARTY), Bundestags-Drucksache 18/2451 of 01 September 2014, available in German at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/024/1802451.pdf.

  32. 32.

    Concerning the problems of ISDS see Krajewski (2014), p. 2. and on possibilities for reform Bungenberg (2015), in this volume, p. 15. The protection of investors by BITs (Bilateral Investment Treaties) was the subject matter of a seminar for students specialising in International and European Public Law at the Ludwig Maximilians University Munich (LMU). I was gratefully pleased that my colleagues and distinguished experts Horst Günter Krenzler, Bruno Simma and Christoph Herrmann discussed the relevant problems (e.g. cloudy terminology like “fair and equitable”; need for approval by the European Parliament for further EU agreements) with the very impressed students. Thanks to the co-operation with Horst Günter Krenzler, Christoph Herrmann (then my research assistant and now my colleague at the Faculty of Law at the University of Passau) and I had the opportunity to present special seminars on World Trade questions with a practical background. Horst Günter Krenzler also contributed to conferences of the LMU, see e.g. Krenzler and Pitschas (2006), p. 11.

  33. 33.

    European Parliament, Resolution on EU Trade and Investment Negotiations with the United States of America, 2013/2558(RSP), Document B7-0187/2013, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2013/2558%28RSP%29.

  34. 34.

    European Parliament, Resolution on EU Trade and Investment Negotiations with the United States of America, 2013/2558(RSP), Document B7-0187/2013, paras. 4–8 (in general) and paras. 8–10 (concerning the negotiating mandate), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2013/2558%28RSP%29.

  35. 35.

    European Parliament, Resolution on EU Trade and Investment Negotiations with the United States of America, 2013/2558(RSP), Document B7-0187/2013, para. 11, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2013/2558%28RSP%29.

  36. 36.

    European Parliament, Resolution on EU Trade and Investment Negotiations with the United States of America, 2013/2558(RSP), Document B7-0187/2013, para. 12, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2013/2558%28RSP%29.

  37. 37.

    European Parliament, Resolution on EU Trade and Investment Negotiations with the United States of America, 2013/2558(RSP), Document B7-0187/2013, para. 13, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2013/2558%28RSP%29. This point became very important (and an argument against conducting negotiations on TTIP at all) after the discovery of the NSA scandal.

  38. 38.

    European Parliament, Resolution on EU trade and investment negotiations with the United States of America, 2013/2558(RSP), Document B7-0187/2013, para. 17, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2013/2558%28RSP%29. This principle is expressly laid down in Article 7 of Regulation (EC) 178/2002 (so called basic regulation on foodstuffs, [2002] OJ L 31/1). See Streinz (2009), p. 53. But this is a general principle of EU law (see Streinz 1998, p. 413 [418 et seq.] and is relevant in all cases of risk assessment, e.g. concerning the matter of environmental protection, cf. ECJ, C-473/98, Kemikalieinspektionen v Toolex Alpha, [2000] ECR I, 5702, paras. 38 et seq., para. 45. For different points of view between the EU and the US see Mavroidis (2003), p. 233.

  39. 39.

    European Parliament, Resolution on EU Trade and Investment Negotiations with the United States of America, 2013/2558(RSP), Document B7-0187/2013, para. 18, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2013/2558%28RSP%29.

  40. 40.

    European Parliament, Resolution on EU trade and investment negotiations with the United States of America, 2013/2558(RSP), Document B7-0187/2013, para. 23, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2013/2558%28RSP%29.

  41. 41.

    European Parliament, Resolution on EU trade and investment negotiations with the United States of America (2013/2558(RSP)). Document B7-0187/2013, para. 25, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2013/2558%28RSP%29. The obligation to obtain the consent of the European Parliament is embodied in Article 218 para. 6 subpara. 2 lit. a(v) TFEU.

  42. 42.

    The UK parliament, e.g., had a Panel Discussion on the potential impact of TTIP on specific sectors in the UK on 14 July 2014.

  43. 43.

    See e.g. the Responses of the Federal Government to: Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Beate Walter-Rosenheimer u.a. und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (Brief Parliamentary Enquiry by MP Beate Walter-Rosenheimer and others and the parliamentary group ALLIANCE 90/GREEN PARTY) of 5 June 2013, Bundestags-Drucksache 17/13735: “Planung und Verhandlung einer transatlantischen Handels- und Investitionspartnerschaft”, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/17/137/1713735.pdf; Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Katharina Dröge u.a. und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (Brief Parliamentary Enquiry of MP Katharina Dröge and others and the parliamentary group ALLIANCE 90/GREEN PARTY) of 11 March 2014, Bundestags-Drucksache 18/828: “Position der Bundesregierung zum weiteren Verlauf der Verhandlungen zum Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership und den ökonomischen Auswirkungen”, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/008/1800828.pdf; Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Katharina Dröge etc. und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN of 21 March 2014, Bundestags-Drucksache 18/919: “Erfahrungen, Bedeutung und zukünftiger Umgang mit Klauseln zu Investor-Staat-Schiedsgerichtsverfahren als Teil von bilateralen Handelsabkommen”, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/009/1800919.pdf; at last Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Katharina Dröge u.a. und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN of 18 August 2014, Bundestags-Drucksache 18/2371 (not yet answered), available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/023/1802371.pdf; Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Dr. Petra Sitte u.a. und der Fraktion DIE LINKE (Brief Parliamentary Enquiry by MP Dr. Petra Sitte and others and the parliamentary group THE LEFT) of 11 September 2013, Bundestags-Drucksache 17/14734: “Das geplante Freihandelsabkommen TTIP/TAFTA zwischen den USA und der Europäischen Union und seine Auswirkungen auf die Bereiche Kultur, Landwirtschaft, Bildung, Wissenschaft und Datenschutz”, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/17/147/1714734.pdf; Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Klaus Ernst u.a. und der Fraktion DIE LINKE (Brief Parliamentary Enquiry by MP Klaus Ernst and others and the parliamentary group THE LEFT) of 28 January 2014, Bundestags-Drucksache 18/258: “Verhandlungen zum EU-USA-Freihandelsabkommen”, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/002/1800258.pdf.

  44. 44.

    See Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Klaus Ernst u.a. und der Fraktion DIE LINKE (Parliamentary Enquiry by MP Klaus Ernst and others and the parliamentary group THE LEFT) of 30 January 2014, Bundestags-Drucksache 18/432: “Soziale, ökologische, ökonomische und politische Effekte des EU-USA Freihandelsabkommens”, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/002/1800258.pdf.

  45. 45.

    From January to September the German Federal Government replied to about 25 written questions of MPs or parliamentary groups on TTIP. During the 17th legislative period the Federal government was based on CDU/CSU and FDP (The Liberals). Then, the Social Democrats as opposition party asked by Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion der SPD (Brief Parliamentary Enquiry by the parliamentary group of the SPD) of 24 September 2013, Bundestags-Drucksache 17/14787: “Transatlantische Handels- und Investment-Partnerschaft”, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/17/147/1714787.pdf.

  46. 46.

    See Antrag der Abgeordneten Thomas Nord u.a. und der Fraktion die Linke (Motion by MP Thomas Nord and others and the parliamentary group THE LEFT) of 8 April 2014, Bundestags-Drucksache 18/1093: “Die Verhandlungen zum EU-USA-Freihandelsabkommen TTIP stoppen”, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/010/1801093.pdf.

  47. 47.

    See Entschließungsantrag der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (Motion to decide a resolution by the parliamentary group ALLIANCE 90/GREEN PARTY) of 18 November 2013, Bundestags-Drucksache 18/65, “zu der verabredeten Debatte zu den Abhöraktivitäten der NSA und den Auswirkungen auf Deutschlands transatlantische Beziehungen”, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/000/1800065.pdf.

  48. 48.

    See Deutscher Bundestag, PuK 2 – Parlamentskorrespondenz: TTIP: Abgeordnete für mehr Transparenz. Ausschuss für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit – 19.02.2014; Forderung nach Klausel für Kultur im TTIP. Ausschuss für Kultur und Medien – 04.06.2014; Chancen und Risiken von TTIP. Parlamentarischer Beirat für nachhaltige Entwicklung, 3 July 2014.

  49. 49.

    Especially exclusion of ISDS, no lower standards in social and environmental questions and concerning foodstuffs, exclusion of cultural questions.

  50. 50.

    Decision of the Bundesrat of 11 July 2014 (924th session): Lack of transparency of the negotiations on TTIP; critical point of view concerning ISDS. There were also inquiries to the Governments of the Länder by Members and parliamentary groups of the parliaments of the German Federal States (Länder), see e.g. Große Anfrage von Abgeordneten der Bremischen Bürgerschaft und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN an den Senat der Freien und Hansestadt Bremen (Enquiry of MPs of the parliament of Bremen to the Senate—the Government of Bremen as a Federal State of Germany), Drucksachen 18/1078 und 18/1187.

  51. 51.

    See Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Katharina Dröge u.a. und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (Brief Parliamentary Enquiry by MP Katharian Dröge and others and the parliamentary group ALLIANCE 90/GREEN PARTY) of 10 April 2014, Bundestags-Drucksache 18/1118, pp. 2 et seq., available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/011/1801118.pdf.

  52. 52.

    Rathke (2014).

  53. 53.

    See House of Lords, European Union Committee, 14th Report of Session 2013–2014, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p. 54, para. 173; House of Commons, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Standard Note SN/EP/6688 (Wepp), 3 October 2014, p. 10. See also below.

  54. 54.

    See the response of Mme Nicole Bricq, ministre du commerce extérieur to the parliamentary questions of MP Mme Maréchal-Le Pen, JO 2014, p. 1267.

  55. 55.

    Schriftliche Information gemäß § 6 EU-InfoG zu Pkt. 2 der Tagesordnung des EU-Ausschusses des Bundesrates (written information of the Austrian Federal Government to the Bundesrat) of 14 May 2014, p. 2.

  56. 56.

    See Tweede Kamer der Staten-General, Letter to EU Commissioner for Trade Karel De Gucht in the framework of the political dialogue: the role of national parliaments in free trade agreements of 25 June 2014: “The chairs of relevant committees in national parliaments who are signatories to this letter believe that free trade agreements should be considered as mixed agreements, since they contain provisions that concern policy areas which were within the competences of the member states. For CETA as well as TTIP (as well as can be foreseen at this stage), this is the case for certain elements of policy areas such as services, transport and investor protection”. The chairs added a further argument which seems to express that TTIP should be ratified by the national parliaments in any case: “In view of the important role national parliaments have in the democratic decision making process of the EU, we feel that it is of great importance that trade agreements such as CETA and TTIP are ratified by the national parliaments. Therefore, we ask you to consider comprehensive trade agreements such as TTIP and CETA as mixed agreements”.

  57. 57.

    So the impression of the German Federal Government, see Bundestags-Drucksache 18/1118, p. 3, No. 7.

  58. 58.

    See European Commission, Karel De Gucht, SPEECH/14/406 to European Affairs Committee of the Bundesrat, Berlin, 22 May 2014, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: The Real Debate, pp. 4 et seq., available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-406_en.htm. The EU Commission could ask the ECJ for its opinion according to Article 218 para 11 TFEU, see Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Klaus Ernst u.a. und der Fraktion DIE LINKE (Response of the German Federal Government to the Brief Parliamentary Enquiries by Members of Parliament Klaus Ernst and others and the parliamentary group THE LEFT) of 28 January 2014 (No. 211), available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/003/1800351.pdf. See, however, European Commission (2014b), p. 6: “Depending on policy areas covered in the final agreement the 28 national parliaments of the EU’s Member States might also have to approve the deal”. In his speech to the German Bundesrat, SPEECH/14/406, Berlin, 22 May 2014, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: The Real Debate, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-406_en.htm, Karel De Gucht also said that having in mind the wide scope of the negotiations TTIP may probably (“wahrscheinlich”) become a mixed agreement with the consequence that national parliaments and also the Bundesrat must be included in the decision (“dass nationale Parlamente und Verfassungsorgane wie der Bundesrat über TTIP mitentscheiden werden”).

  59. 59.

    European Commission, Press Release, IP/14/1235 of 30 October 2014, Singapore: The Commission to Request a Court of Justice Opinion on the Trade Deal, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1185.

  60. 60.

    See Article 10 para. 2 subpara. 2, Article 12 TEU.

  61. 61.

    See, e.g., the consultations between Karel De Gucht and the German Bundesrat, SPEECH/14/406, Berlin, 22 May 2014, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: The Real Debate, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-406_en.htm.

  62. 62.

    Principle of conferral, Art. 5 para. 1 TEU; Art. 4 para. 1 TEU.

  63. 63.

    Craig and de Búrca (2011), p. 334. Concerning the shared competences see Art. 2 para. 2 and Art. 4 TFEU.

  64. 64.

    Hartley (2010), p. 174.

  65. 65.

    On timings and process of TTIP negotiations see House of Commons, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Standard Note SN/EP/6688 (Wepp), 3 October 2014, pp. 3 et seq.

  66. 66.

    Former EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht said that there was a danger that the TTIP would never be agreed because a lack of political leadership had reduced the chances of an agreement by 2015 and that afterwards there could be further delays because of the US presidential election, Financial Times, Time Is Running out for US–Europe Trade Deal, 26 September 2014.

  67. 67.

    See Herrmann and Streinz (2014), p. 587 (612 et seq., § 11 paras. 41 and 43) with further references. ECJ (Grand Chamber), Opinion 1/08, GATS – Schedules of specific commitments – Common transport policy, [2009] ECR I, 11129.

  68. 68.

    See Art. 207 para. 1 TFEU.

  69. 69.

    Art. 207 para. 5 TFEU. Cf. Hahn (2011), para. 45; Dashwood et al. (2011), p. 948. This exemption was included according to a mandate of the European Council, see Herrmann and Streinz (2014), p. 587 (613, § 11 para. 44); Weiß (2011), para. 53. See however Bungenberg (2010b), p. 123 (132).

  70. 70.

    Art. 4 para 2 lit. g TFEU.

  71. 71.

    Craig and de Búrca (2011), p. 322.

  72. 72.

    Cf. Bungenberg (2010b), p. 123 (133). See e.g. the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part of 15 October 2009, [2011] OJ L 127/1.

  73. 73.

    Only this aspect is covered by the exclusive competence of the EU, see Art. 3 para. 1 lit. b TFEU; Weiß (2011), paras. 52 et seq.

  74. 74.

    Harmonisation according to Art. 114 TFEU applies for the achievement of the internal market (Art. 26 TFEU) which falls under the shared competence, Art. 4 para. 2 lit. a TFEU as well as social policy (ibid. lit. b), environment (ibid. lit. e), consumer protection (ibid. lit. f) and energy (ibid. lit. i). Concerning health protection harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States is expressly excluded (Art. 168 para. 5 TFEU).

  75. 75.

    See No. 36 of the mandate, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf.

  76. 76.

    See No. 25 of the mandate, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf.

  77. 77.

    See Art. 149 para. 3, Art. 153 para. 2 lit.a TFEU: exclusion of harmonisation; Art. 153 para. 5 TFEU: complete exclusion of the competence of the EU. No. 32 of the mandate, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf, mentions the inclusion of “mechanisms to support the promotion of decent work through effective domestic implementation of International Labour Organization (ILO) core labour standards”.

  78. 78.

    Cf. Weiß (2011), paras. 76 et seq. for the different opinions on the meaning of Art. 207 para. 6 TFEU.

  79. 79.

    See Weiß (2011), paras. 40 and 44. For shared competence e.g. Dimopulos (2011), pp. 104 et seq.; Bungenberg (2001), p. 29 (40 et seq.).

  80. 80.

    See No. 22 of the mandate, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf.

  81. 81.

    Opinion of the Legal Service of the Council, Council Doc. 17144/12 of 30 November 2012.

  82. 82.

    See Dimopulos (2011), pp. 190 et seq. See however e.g. Bungenberg (2010a), p. 81 (88 et seq.). An added problem: the ICSID Convention is only open to states that are parties of the ICSID Convention and it is doubtful whether it will be opened for the EU; see Reinisch (2011), p. 43 (53) with further references.

  83. 83.

    See No. 23 of the mandate, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf.

  84. 84.

    Even the EU Commission is considering renouncing ISDS, cf. EU erwägt Verzicht auf Schiedsgerichte bei TTIP, Die ZEIT, 23 October 2013, available at http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2014-10/ttip-eu-kommission-schiedsgerichtsverfahren.

  85. 85.

    Dashwood et al. (2011), p. 939.

  86. 86.

    Craig and de Búrca (2011), p. 335; Müller-Ibold (2012), Vorb. Art. 206–207, paras. 12 et seq. See e.g. ECJ (Grand Chamber), Opinion 1/08, GATS – Schedules of specific commitments – Common transport policy, [2009] ECR I, 11129, para. 127.

  87. 87.

    For exemptions concerning territorially limited regimes like the Convention on the protection of the Alps (Alpine Convention), Council Decision 96/191/EC of 26 February 1996, [1996] OJ L 61/31 (EU and Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Slovenia/Switzerland. Liechtenstein, Monaco), see Kumin and Bittner (2012), p. 75 (82).

  88. 88.

    Cf. Art. 10 para. 2 subpara. 2 TEU.

  89. 89.

    Art. 207 para, 4 subpara. 1 TFEU.

  90. 90.

    Art 207 para. 4 subpara. 2 TFEU. But after the Treaty of Lisbon most of the relevant articles do not require unanimity, see Hahn (2011), para. 118: Only Art. 65 para. 3 and 4 TFEU. Concerning Art. 118 TFEU, however, the establishment of language arrangements (which are a necessary element for European intellectual property rights) requires the Council to act unanimously (Art. 118 para. 2 TFEU). Therefore, the rule of Art. 118 para. 1 TFEU (majority voting of the Council in the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure) has no effect in practice. See Stieper (2011), para. 27; Pernice and Hindelang (2010), p. 407 (412); Streinz (2013), p. 892 (894).

  91. 91.

    Art. 207 para. 4 subpara. 3 TFEU.

  92. 92.

    See No. 9 of the mandate, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf.

  93. 93.

    See No. 21 of the mandate, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf.

  94. 94.

    See No. 28 et seq. of the mandate, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf.

  95. 95.

    See No. 22 et seq. of the mandate, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf.

  96. 96.

    Art. 207 para. 3, Art. 218 para. 5 TFEU.

  97. 97.

    Art. 207 para. 3, Art. 218 para. 6 TFEU.

  98. 98.

    Art. 289 para. 1, Art. 294 TFEU.

  99. 99.

    Art. 207 para. 3, Art. 218 para. 6 lit. a(v), Art. 207 para. 2 TFEU. See Lorenzmeier (2011), para. 49; Müller-Ibold (2012), Art. 207 AEUV para. 75. Concerning the intensive participation of the European Parliament in CCP agreements like TTIP see Nettesheim and Duvigneau (2012), AEUV paras. 46 et seq.

  100. 100.

    See Schmalenbach (2011), para. 7.

  101. 101.

    See Müller-Ibold (2012), Art. 216, para. 15.

  102. 102.

    See Rosas (2000), p. 200 (207 et seq.); Eeckhout (2004), pp. 218 et seq.

  103. 103.

    See Kumin and Bittner (2012), p. 75 (83) with reference to Recitals 8 to 10 of Council Decision (2004/294/EC) of 8 March 2004, [2004] OJ L 97/53 (concerning liability in the field of nuclear energy).

  104. 104.

    Rathke (2014), 5.2, available at http://www.no-ttip.de/Material/Kompetenzen.pdf. See to this question Neframi (2002), p. 193 (198 et seq.). Concerning Member States’ duty to cooperate when exercising their retained powers see Hillion (2010), pp. 106 et seq. concerning the risk of delay or even blockade see Sattler (2007), pp. 139 et seq.

  105. 105.

    See ECJ, C-12/86, Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, [1987] ECR I, 3719, para. 11; ECJ, Opinion 1/94, WTO/GATS/TRIPS, [1994] ECR I, 5267, para. 108; ECJ, C-459/03, Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant), [2006] ECR I, 4635, para. 85. See Kaiser (2009), pp. 53 et seq.

  106. 106.

    For the declaration of the division of competences by declarations to mixed agreements to prove transparency against third parties see Kumin and Bittner (2012), p. 75 (80).

  107. 107.

    See ECJ, C-12/86, Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, [1987] ECR I, 3719, para. 7; ECJ, C-459/03, Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant), [2006] ECR I, 4635, para. 82.

  108. 108.

    See ECJ, C-12/86, Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, [1987] ECR I, 3719, para. 9; ECJ, Opinion 1/94, WTO/GATS/TRIPS, [1994] ECR I, 5267, para. 108.

  109. 109.

    See ECJ, C-12/86, Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, [1987] ECR I, 3719, paras. 10, 12; ECJ, C-53/96, Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice, [1998] ECR I, 3606, paras. 22 et seq.

  110. 110.

    See e.g. Recital 5 of the Council Decision 2004/368/EC of 30 March 2004 concerning the provisional application of the Agreement on the participation of the Czech Republic etc. in the European Economic Area and the provisional application of four related agreements, [2004] OJ L 130/1.

  111. 111.

    See Art. 5 para. 1, Art. 4 para. 1 TEU, Art. 207 para. 6 TFEU.

  112. 112.

    See Kaiser (2009), p. 83.

  113. 113.

    See Art. 59 para. 1 sentence 2 Basic Law. See Streinz (2014), Art. 59, para. 9.

  114. 114.

    Art. 77 para. 1 sentence 1 Basic Law.

  115. 115.

    Art. 59 para. 2 Basic Law. Cf. Streinz (2014), Art. 59, para. 32.

  116. 116.

    Article 82 para. 2 Rule of Procedure of the Bundestag. See Streinz (2014), Art. 59, para. 51. Concerning the role of national parliaments in external relations see Bollrath (2008), pp. 175 et seq.

  117. 117.

    Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany; Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (GG); translation by Tomuschat/Curry.

  118. 118.

    Art. 23 para. 3 sentence 1 and 2 Basic Law.

  119. 119.

    Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union (EUZBBG) of 4 July 2013, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) 2013 I, p. 2170, based on Art. 23 para. 3 sentence 3 Basic Law. This law terminates the same law of 12 March 1993 (BGBl. I, p. 311), strengthening the role of the Bundestag.

  120. 120.

    See Section 3: The notification shall be comprehensive, as early as possible and continuous and shall cover, in particular, the Federal Government’s decision-making process, the preparation and course of discussions within the institutions of the EU.

  121. 121.

    Section 5 para. 1 No. 5 and 6.

  122. 122.

    See Koch (2011), p. 316, para. 20.

  123. 123.

    Section 5 para. 1 No. 4.

  124. 124.

    See Art. 16 para 2 and para. 1 TEU.

  125. 125.

    Section 8 paras. 1, 2, 4 and 5.

  126. 126.

    Art. 12 lit. a TEU.

  127. 127.

    Cf. Art. 4 para. 3 TEU.

  128. 128.

    See Streinz (2014), Art. 23, para. 114.

  129. 129.

    Art. 59 para. 2 sentence 1 Basic Law.

  130. 130.

    See Art. 50, Art. 77 Basic Law.

  131. 131.

    See Art. 77 paras. 3 and 4 Basic Law.

  132. 132.

    Art. 74 para. 1 No. 25 in conjunction with Art. 74 para. 2 Basic Law.

  133. 133.

    Art. 23 para. 2 Basic Law.

  134. 134.

    See Streinz (2014), Art. 23, paras. 118 et seq.

  135. 135.

    See Art. 16 paras. 2 and 1 TEU.

  136. 136.

    Art. 23 para. 4 Basic Law.

  137. 137.

    Art. 23 para. 2, Art. 50 Basic Law.

  138. 138.

    Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Bund und Ländern in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union (EUZBLG) of 12 March 1993 (BGBl. 1993 I, p. 313), amended by Act of 22 September 2009 (BGBl. I, p. 3031).

  139. 139.

    See Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (Response of the Federal Government to the Brief Parliamentary Enquiry by the parliamentary group ALLIANCE 90/GREEN PARTY) of 10 April 2014, Bundestags-Drucksache 18/1118, p. 2.

  140. 140.

    Cf. the different points of views on “TTIP and Culture” of the EU and the US, paper of the European Commission of 16 July 2014.

  141. 141.

    Concerning this aspect in general see Maresceau (2010), p. 16.

  142. 142.

    Concerning the legislative and regulatory process of the US see Parker and Alemanno (2014).

References

  • Bollrath L (2008) Die Vertragsschlusskompetenz der Europäischen Gemeinschaften auf dem Gebiet der Gemeinsamen Handelspolitik, pp 175 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Bungenberg M (2001) The division of competences between the EU and its member states in the area of investment politics. In: Bungenberg M, Griebel J, Hindelang S (eds) International investment and EU law, p 29

    Google Scholar 

  • Bungenberg M (2010a) Die Kompetenzverteilung zwischen EU und Mitgliedstaaten “nach Lissabon”. In: Bungenberg M, Griebel J, Hindelang S (eds) Internationaler Investitionsschutz und Europarecht, p 81

    Google Scholar 

  • Bungenberg M (2010b) Going global? The EU common commercial policy after Lisbon. In: Herrmann C, Terhechte JP (eds) European yearbook of international economic law, p 123

    Google Scholar 

  • Bungenberg M (2015) Towards a more balanced international investment law 2.0. In: Herrmann C, Simma B, Streinz R (eds) Trade policy between law, diplomacy and scholarship: Liber amicorum in memoriam Horst G. Krenzler. Springer, Heidelberg, pp. 15–37

    Google Scholar 

  • Craig P, de Búrca G (2011) EU law. Text, cases and materials, 5th edn

    Google Scholar 

  • Dashwood AA et al (2011) Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law, 6th edn

    Google Scholar 

  • De Gucht K (2013) You’re wrong, George Monbiot – there is nothing secret about this EU trade deal. The Guardian, 18 December 2013. Available at http://gu.com/p/3ya2k

  • DIE ZEIT, Grüne leaken Geheimdokument zum Freihandelsabkommen, 7 March 2014. Available at http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2014-03/freihandelsabkommen-ttip-eu-usa

  • Dimopulos A (2011) EU foreign investment law

    Google Scholar 

  • Eberhardt P (2013) Konzerne versus Staaten: Mit Schiedsgerichten gegen die Demokratie, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, p 29

    Google Scholar 

  • Eeckhout P (2004) External relations of the European Union. Legal and constitutional foundations, pp 218 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission (2014a) Statement/14/12, “Stepping up a Gear”, 18 February 2014, p 2. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-12_en.htm

  • European Commission (2014b) The transatlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP). TTIP explained, 8 May 2014. Available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152462.pdf

  • European Commission (2014c) Towards an EU-US trade deal. Making trade work for you, 28 March 2014. Available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152276.pdf

  • Greive M (2014) Tod eines Handelsabkommens, Welt am Sonntag, 22 July 2014, p 4. Available at http://www.welt.de/130348973

  • Hahn M (2011) Art. 207 AEUV. In: Calliess C, Ruffert M, EUV/AEUV-Kommentar, 4th edn

    Google Scholar 

  • Hartley TC (2010) The foundations of European Union Law, 7th edn, p 174

    Google Scholar 

  • Herrmann (2015) Transleakancy. In: Herrmann C, Simma B, Streinz R (eds) Trade policy between law, diplomacy and scholarship: Liber amicorum in memoriam Horst G. Krenzler. Springer, Heidelberg, pp. 39–46

    Google Scholar 

  • Herrmann C, Streinz T (2014) Die EU als Mitglied der WTO. In: von Arnauld A (ed) Europäische Außenbeziehungen, EnzEuR, vol 10, p 587

    Google Scholar 

  • Hillion C (2010) Mixity and coherence in EU external relations: the significance of the “duty of cooperation”. In: Hillion C, Koutrakos P (eds) Mixed agreements revisited. The EU and its member states in the world, pp 106 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaiser F (2009) Gemischte Abkommen im Lichte bundesstaatlicher Erfahrungen

    Google Scholar 

  • Koch A (2011) In: von Arnauld A, Hufeld U (eds) Systematischer Kommentar zu den Lissabon-Begleitgesetzen, p 316 para. 20

    Google Scholar 

  • Konttinen J (2013) Professori: Suomen valta säätää lakeja voi vaarantua, Helsingin Sanomat, 15 December 2013. Available in Finnish at http://www.hs.fi/sunnuntai/a1386995885773

  • Krajewski M (2014) Zu Investitionsschutz und Investor-Staat-Streitbeilegung im Transatlantischen Handels- und Investitionspartnerschaftsabkommen (TTIP), Kurzgutachten für die Bundestagsfraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, 1 May 2014, p 2

    Google Scholar 

  • Kraus M (2015) Die Transatlantische Handels- und Investitionspartnerschaft (TTIP) – Bedeutung für den Lebensmittelhandel, Behr’s Jahrbuch für die Lebensmittelwirtschaft 2015, p 19

    Google Scholar 

  • Krenzler HG, Pitschas C (2006) Die Gemeinsame Handelspolitik im Verfassungsvertrag – ein Schritt in die richtige Richtung. In: Herrmann C, Krenzler HG, Streinz R (eds) Die Außenwirtschaftspolitik der Europäischen Union nach dem Verfassungsvertrag, p 11

    Google Scholar 

  • Kumin A, Bittner P (2012) Die “gemischten” Abkommen zwischen der Europäischen Union und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und dritten Völkerrechtssubjekten andererseits, EuR-Beiheft 2, p 75

    Google Scholar 

  • Lorenzmeier S (2011) Art. 218 AEUV para. 49. In: Grabitz E, Hilf M, Nettesheim M (eds) Das Recht der Europäischen Union. Kommentar

    Google Scholar 

  • Maresceau M (2010) A typology of mixed bilateral agreements. In: Hillion C, Koutrakos P (eds) Mixed agreements revisited. The EU and its member states in the world, p 16

    Google Scholar 

  • Mavroidis P (2003) The trade disputes concerning health policy between EC and US. In: Petersmann E-U, Pollack MA (eds) Transatlantic economic disputes. The EU, the US, and the WTO, p 233

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller-Ibold T (2012) In: Lenz CO, Borchardt K-D (eds) EU-Verträge. Kommentar, 6th edn

    Google Scholar 

  • Neframi E (2002) International responsibility of the European community and of the member states under mixed agreements. In: Cannizzaro E (ed) The European Union as an actor in international relations, p 193

    Google Scholar 

  • Nettesheim M, Duvigneau JL (2012) Art. 207. In: Streinz R (ed) EUV/AEUV-Kommentar, 2nd edn

    Google Scholar 

  • Parker R, Alemanno A (2014) Towards effective regulatory cooperation under TTIP: a comparative overview of the EU and US legislative and regulatory systems, p 8. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/resources/

  • Pernice I, Hindelang S (2010) Potenziale europäischer Politik nach Lissabon – Europapolitische Perspektiven für Deutschland, seine Institutionen, seine Wirtschaft und seine Bürger, EuZW, p 407

    Google Scholar 

  • Rathke H (2014) Fragen zur Zuständigkeitsverteilung zwischen EU und Mitgliedstaaten sowie zur Ratifikation des Abkommens über eine Transatlantische Handels- und Investitionspartnerschaft, Ausarbeitung des Wissenschaftlichen Dienstes des Deutschen Bundestags (PE 6 – 3000 – 49)

    Google Scholar 

  • Reinisch A (2011) The division of powers between the EU and its member states “after Lisbon”. In: Bungenberg M, Griebel J, Hindelang S (eds) International investment and EU law, p 43

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosas A (2000) The European Union and mixed agreements. In: Dashwood AA, Hillion C (eds) The general law of EC external relations, p 200

    Google Scholar 

  • Sattler S (2007) Gemischte Abkommen und gemischte Mitgliedschaften der EG und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten, pp 139 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmalenbach K (2011) Art. 218 AEUV para. 7. In: Calliess C, Ruffert M (eds) EUV/AEUV-Kommentar, 4th edn

    Google Scholar 

  • Stieper M (2011) Art. 118 AEUV para. 27. In: Grabitz E, Hilf M, Nettesheim M (eds) Das Recht der Europäischen Union. Kommentar

    Google Scholar 

  • Streinz R (1998) The precautionary principle in food law. Eur Food Law Rev 8:413

    Google Scholar 

  • Streinz R (2009) Risk decisions in cases of persisting scientific uncertainty: the precautionary principle in European food law. In: Woodman G, Klippel D (eds) Risk and the law, p 53

    Google Scholar 

  • Streinz R (2012) Europarecht, 9th edn, paras. 371 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Streinz R (2013) Die Verstärkte Zusammenarbeit: Eine realistische Form abgestufter Integration, JuS, p 892

    Google Scholar 

  • Streinz R (2014) In: Sachs M (ed) Grundgesetz. Kommentar, 7th edn

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiß W (2011) Art. 207 AEUV. In: Grabitz E, Hilf M, Nettesheim M (eds) Das Recht der Europäischen Union. Kommentar

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiß W (2014) Vertragliche Handelspolitik der EU. In: von Arnauld A (ed) Europäische Außenbeziehungen, EnzEuR, vol 10, p 515

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ludwig Maximilians University Munich, 80539, Munich, Germany

    Rudolf Streinz

Authors
  1. Rudolf Streinz
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Rudolf Streinz .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Passau, Passau, Germany

    Christoph Herrmann

  2. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Bruno Simma

  3. Ludwig Maximilians University Munich, Munich, Germany

    Rudolf Streinz

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Streinz, R. (2015). Disputes on TTIP: Does the Agreement Need the Consent of the German Parliament?. In: Herrmann, C., Simma, B., Streinz, R. (eds) Trade Policy between Law, Diplomacy and Scholarship. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15690-3_15

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation