Abstract
In this chapter, I describe how complement toposes, with their paraconsistent internal logic, lead to a more abstract theory of topos logic. Béziau’s work in Universal Logic – including his ideas on logical structures, axiomatic emptiness and on logical many-valuedness – is central in this shift and therefore it is with great pleasure that I wrote this chapter for the present commemorative volume.
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Notes
- 1.
A good starting point are Chapters 1, 2 and 4 of [26].
- 2.
This elucidation of toposes in logical terms follows closely [1].
- 3.
As Awodey has noted, this is Russell’s notion of propositional function, for example in The Principles of Mathematics § 22 or Principia Mathematica, pp. 14 and 161.
- 4.
Note by the way that, unlike many authors, I prefer the equalizers presentation of logic, not the pullbacks one.
- 5.
Let \(f\!:\!X\!\longrightarrow\!Y\) and \(g\!:\!X\!\longrightarrow\!Y\) be morphisms in a category C. An equalizer in C for f and g is given by an object W and a morphism \(i\!:\!W\!\longrightarrow\!X\) in C with the following two properties: (1) \(f\circ i=g\circ i\) and (2) for any morphism \(h\!:\!Z\!\longrightarrow\!X\) in C, if \(f\circ h=g\circ h\), then there is exactly one morphism in C \(k\!:\!Z\!\longrightarrow W\) such that \(h=i\circ k\).
- 6.
- 7.
I have made a little abuse of notation, for I used ‘\({}_{S}p\)’ in both \(\models_{{}_{S}\mathcal{E}}\) and \(\models_{I}\). In rigour, \({}_{S}p\) is a morphism which corresponds to a formula \((_{S}p)^{\ast}\) in a possibly different language, but there is no harm if one identifies them. A proof can be found in [15, see \(\mathsection 8.3\) for the soundness part and \(\mathsection 10.6\) for the completeness part].
- 8.
I use the word ‘slogan’ here pretty much in the sense of van Inwagen: ‘a vague phrase of ordinary English whose use is by no means dictated by the mathematically formulated speculations it is supposed to summarize’ [36, p. 163], ‘but that looks as if it was’, I would add.
- 9.
- 10.
It is important to set their individual contributions. Of the ten diagrams in [28, Ch. 11], Mortensen drew the first one and the final five, while Lavers drew the remaining four. The diagram for the dual-conditional never was explicitly drawn, but it was discussed in [28, p. 109]. The full story, as told by Mortensen in personal communication is as follows. Mortensen gave a talk at the Australian National University (Canberra) in late 1986, on paraconsistent topos logic, arguing the topological motivation for closed set logic. He defined a complement topos, drew the first three diagrams from Inconsistent Mathematics, chapter 11, that is including the complement versions of \({}_{S}\mathit{true}\) and paraconsistent negation, and criticized Goodman’s views on the conditional. But it was not seen clearly at that stage how the logic would turn out. Peter Lavers was present (also Richard Routley, Robert K. Meyer, Michael A. McRobbie, Chris Brink and others). For a couple of days in Canberra, Mortensen and Lavers tried without success to thrash it out. Mortensen returned home to Adelaide and two weeks later Lavers’ letter arrived in Adelaide, in which he stressed that inverting the order is the key insight to understanding the problem, drew the diagrams for conjunction and disjunction, and pointed out that subtraction is the right topological dual for the conditional. Mortensen then responded with the four diagrams for the \(S5\) conditional, and one for quantification (last five diagrams in Inconsistent Mathematics, chapter 11). A few months later (1987), Mortensen wrote the first paper, with Lavers as co-author, and sent it to Saunders Mac Lane and William Lawvere (also Routley, Meyer, Priest). Mac Lane replied but Lawvere did not. A later version of that paper became the eleventh chapter of Inconsistent Mathematics.
- 11.
Mortensen and Lavers use the names complement-classifier and complement topos, which are now the names set in the literature (cf. [11, 28, 29, 37]). I have decided not to use the name ‘dual topos’ because the adjective ‘dual’ applied to categories has another well-entrenched meaning in category theory.
- 12.
I have attempted such a categorial description of this kind of duality in [10].
- 13.
Again, I have made a little abuse of notation, for I used ‘\({}_{D}p\)’ in both \(\models_{{}_{D}\mathcal{E}}\) and \(\models_{I}\). In rigour, \({}_{D}p\) is a morphism which corresponds to a formula \((_{D}p)^{\ast}\) in a possibly different language.
- 14.
By abuse of notation but to simplify reading, I will not indicate that the order here is dual to that in standard toposes, unless there is risk of confusion.
- 15.
- 16.
Thus, as Vasyukov ([37] p. 292) points out: ‘(…) in Set we always have paraconsistency because of the presence of both types of subobject classifiers (…)’ just as we always have in it (at least) intuitionistic logic. The presence of paraconsistency within classical logic is not news. See, for example [8], where some paraconsistent negations in S5 and classical first-order logic are defined.
- 17.
It is easy to verify that after making all the necessary changes, i.e. changing \({}_{S}\mathit{true}_{\textbf{${S}^{\downarrow\downarrow}$}}\) for \({}_{D}\mathit{false}_{\textbf{${S}^{\downarrow\downarrow}$}}\), etc. the names are ordered in the same way as they are in \({}_{S}\) \({S}^{\downarrow\downarrow}\).
- 18.
Someone could argue that these are not notions of logical consequence at all, since logical consequence has to satisfy the Tarskian conditions. I guess (and hope) that readers of this Festschrift do not have this kind of doubts. For a defense of the logicality of non-Tarskian relations of logical consequence, see for example [12].
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Acknowledgement
I want to thank for the support from the CONACyT project CCB 2011 166502 “Aspectos filosóficos de la modalidad”. Diagrams were drawn using Paul Taylor’s diagrams package v. 3.94.
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To Jean-Yves Béziau for his 50th birthday, and also to Christian Edward Mortensen for his 70th birthday.
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Estrada-González, L. (2015). From (Paraconsistent) Topos Logic to Universal (Topos) Logic. In: Koslow, A., Buchsbaum, A. (eds) The Road to Universal Logic. Studies in Universal Logic. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15368-1_12
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