Testing the “Veil of Ignorance” Hypothesis in Constitutional Choice: Evidence from the German Grundgesetz

  • Agnes StraußEmail author
Part of the Studies in Public Choice book series (SIPC, volume 32)


The German constitution gives only mixed evidence to support the three propositions formulated by the Veil of Ignorance Project. The content analysis of the Grundgesetz reveals a high share of authority-based power relations in the constitutional text and a majority of over 97% positive power relations. The complexity of the drafting process as well as the high number of involved veto players leads to the problem that the contribution of uncertainty on the content of the constitution may not be traceable only reviewing the constitutional text.


Power Relation Median Voter Constitutional Rule Veto Player Nazi Regime 
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The author thanks Nora El-Bialy, Julian Boakye-Nyarko, David Börn, Matthias Dauner, Prof. Thomas Eger, Asmaa Ezzat, Patricia Frohberg, Jerg Gutmann, Louis Imbeau, Jun.-Prof. Patrick Leyens, Marwa Mamdouh, Janina Satzer, Prof. Stefan Voigt and Nina Ziesemer for valuable discussions and comments.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Law and EconomicsUniversity of HamburgHamburgGermany

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