Abstract
Time and again, discussions on “just” or “fair” constitutional rules are structured around the veil of ignorance (Rawls) or uncertainty (Buchanan). But how useful has this tool really been for identifying a set of rules large groups could agree to unanimously? Are thicker veils really connected with rules leading to more redistribution? This paper surveys the political economics literature broadly conceived and looks at theoretical, experimental, and empirical approaches. It concludes that the central conjectures of veilonomics are unsatisfactory on theoretical grounds and refuted both experimentally and empirically.
In reality, Constitutions are not written by social planners and veils of ignorance have large holes in them.
(Aghion et al. 2004: 578)
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Notes
- 1.
To reiterate, they are (1) each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others and (2) social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. The first principle always has precedence over the second; that is, they are ordered lexicographically.
- 2.
As far as I know, nobody has ever bothered to derive such a constitution in Rawlsian terms.
- 3.
One could argue that “step zero” of his theory was clearly normative. It would read: “You ought to forget y for the sake of this experiment.” As was just pointed out, this imperative cannot be executed and the whole enterprise seems to be non-starter.
- 4.
Rawls could, of course, claim that these experiments do not really depict what he had in mind.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
It would be interesting to test whether any constitutional convention has agreed on such a meta-principle before agreeing on any substantial rules. Additionally, it would be interesting to know whether any constitutions themselves contain provisions requiring the generality of constitutional rules.
- 8.
While writing their paper and reflecting upon durability, Buchanan and Vanberg might have had the US experience in mind. Elkins et al. (2009) show, however, that the median life span of all written constitutions produced since 1789 is below twenty years.
- 9.
Remember Mueller (2001) who uses exactly the same device to talk about identity uncertainty.
- 10.
Brennan et al. (2008) are the first to test whether there is a systematic relationship between other regarding preferences and attitudes toward risk but fail to find any such relationship.
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Acknowledgments
The author thanks Louis Imbeau for the suggestion to produce a survey of the use of veils in both Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. This paper was finished while I was a distinguished guest fellow at the Notre Dame Institute for Advanced Study. I thank my colleagues there for their hospitality and interesting discussions and Matthias Dauner, Nora El Bialy, Jerg Gutmann, Felix Horbach, Janina Satzer, and George Tridimas for helpful suggestions.
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Voigt, S. (2015). Veilonomics: On the Use and Utility of Veils in Constitutional Political Economy. In: Imbeau, L., Jacob, S. (eds) Behind a Veil of Ignorance?. Studies in Public Choice, vol 32. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14953-0_2
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