Advertisement

Constitutional Convulsions in Modern Greece

  • George TridimasEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Public Choice book series (SIPC, volume 32)

Abstract

Over the twentieth century, Greece shifted from monarchy to republic in a sequence that involved civil war, dictatorship, rigged referendums and several constitutional revisions. This experience is used to examine the changing profile of power relations of the post-WWII monarchical and republican constitutions. A pattern of increasing authority, instrumental and positive power relations is observed. Of those, only the former trend is compatible with the definitional propositions of the VOIP.

Keywords

Constitution Monarchy Republic Power Modern Greece 

JEL classification

D7 N4 

References

  1. Clogg R (1986) A short history of modern Greece. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  2. Congleton RD (2011) Perfecting parliament: constitutional reform and the origins of western democracy. Cambridge University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  3. Eleftheriadis P (2005) Constitutional reform and the rule of law in Greece. West European Polit 28:317–334CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Ferejohn JA (2002) Judicializing politics, politicizing law. Law Contemp Probl 65:41–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Gallant TW (2001) Modern Greece. Hodder Arnold, LondonGoogle Scholar
  6. Greek Parliament (2004) Thirty years from the 1975 constitution. The Greek constitutions from Rigas to today. (In Greek)Google Scholar
  7. Imbeau LM (2009) Testing the « veil of ignorance » hypothesis in constitutional choice: a « walk-talk » approach. J Pub Fin Pub Choice 26(1):3–21Google Scholar
  8. Imbeau LM, Jacob S (2011) Is the “veil of ignorance” in constitutional choice a myth? an empirical exploration informed by a theory of power. In: Marciano A (ed) Constitutional mythologies, new perspectives on controlling the state. Springer, New York, pp 53–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Imbeau LM, Jacob S (2015) Measuring the opacity of the ‘Veil of ignorance’ in constitutions: theory, method and some results. In: Imbeau LM, Jacob S (eds) Behind a veil of ignorance? power and uncertainty in constitutional design, New York, SpringerGoogle Scholar
  10. Mueller DC (1991) Constitutional rights. J Law, Econ Organ 7:313–333Google Scholar
  11. Mueller DC (1996) Constitutional democracy. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  12. Mueller DC (1999) On amending constitutions. Const Polit Econ 10, 385No396Google Scholar
  13. Mueller DC (2005) Constitutional political economy in the European Union. Public Choice 124:57–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Shapiro M, Stone Sweet A (2002) Constitutional judicial review. In: Shapiro M, Stone Sweet A (eds) On law, politics and judicialization. Oxford University Press. Oxford, pp 138–148Google Scholar
  15. Tridimas G (2010) Referendum and the choice between monarchy and republic in Greece. Const Polit Econ 21:119–144CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Veremis T (1997) The military in Greek politics: from independence to democracy. Black Rose Books, LondonGoogle Scholar
  17. Voigt Stefan (1999) Implicit constitutional change—changing the meaning of the constitution without changing the text of the document. Eur J Law Econ 7:197–224CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Finance, Accounting and EconomicsUlster University Business SchoolAntrimUK

Personalised recommendations