Analysing the Apprenticeship System in the Maghribi Traders Coalition

  • Christopher FrantzEmail author
  • Martin K. Purvis
  • Mariusz Nowostawski
  • Bastin Tony Roy Savarimuthu
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9002)


In this work we further the investigation into the functioning of the Maghribi Traders Coalition – a historically significant traders collective that operated along the North African coast between the 10th and 13th centuries. They acted as a closed group whose interactions were governed by informal institutions (i.e. norms). Historical accounts point to an apprenticeship system that was in force in this society. In this work we propose an agent-based model of the society with the apprenticeship mechanism and analyse the role the mechanism may have played in the removal of cheaters from their trade relationship networks.


Maghribi Traders Coalition Apprenticeship system Institutions Norms Social simulation Agent-based modelling 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christopher Frantz
    • 1
    Email author
  • Martin K. Purvis
    • 1
  • Mariusz Nowostawski
    • 2
  • Bastin Tony Roy Savarimuthu
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Information ScienceUniversity of OtagoDunedinNew Zealand
  2. 2.Faculty of Computer Science and Media TechnologyGjøvik University CollegeGjøvikNorway

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