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The Role of Aviation in Climate Change Mitigation

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Handbook of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation
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Abstract

This chapter summarizes the recent policy and research development of the aviation emission reduction and its mechanism. First we trace the policy process surrounding UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and Post-Kyoto Protocol negotiations, mostly focusing on the activities in the ICAO. Key factors in the policy process are (1) the disparities in the field of international aviation among the nations, such as income level and preferences between environment and growth. Such disparities could be interpreted as the notion of “common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities (CBDR)” in the Kyoto Protocol. The second key factor is (2) uncertainties surrounding the impact of GHG emission on utilities of nations. Then we look into the theoretical developments in the field of international aviation from the economics viewpoint. Main objectives are to illustrate the impact of market-based mechanism (MBM), such as the emission allowance trading, and the inherent difficulties to reach social optimal allocations through the bargaining among nations in the presence of nations’ disparities and uncertainties of GHG emission’s impact on nations’ utilities.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Kyoto Protocol Article 2.2. “The parties shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases… from aviation …, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization….”

  2. 2.

    This section relies on the contents of Hihara and Okano (2012).

  3. 3.

    Material presented to ICAO GIACC/3 February 2009 by Paul Steele on behalf of ACI, CANSO, IATA, and ICCAIA.

  4. 4.

    The negotiations process among major member states and relevant papers in the process can be found in GIACC (2008), GIACC (2009), and ICAO (2009).

  5. 5.

    The EU’s inclusion of international aviation into the EU-ETS is documented in EU (2009).

  6. 6.

    They are specifically from proposition 3 in Sect. 4, “Numerical Results” of Okada (2004).

  7. 7.

    They are specifically from line 14 of page 9 and Theorem in page 19 in Sect. 3, “Noncooperative Bargaining Process of Emission Reduction” of Okada (2004).

  8. 8.

    Notice that the price here is US$ per ton carbon, not US$ per ton CO 2. External cost from car gasoline consumption is about 5,000–50,000 yen per ton carbon, and 30,000 yen per ton carbon is the medium estimate according to Kanemoto et al. (2006). According to IPCC (2007a), the average social cost of CO 2 based on 100 estimates is about 12 US$ per ton of CO 2 for 2005, although the estimation range is from −3 to 95 US$. The external cost of aviation is from 0.16 to1.09 euro per aircraft-km for CO 2 and H 2 O for average technology if price of CO 2 ton is 30 euro according to Ding et al. (2003).

  9. 9.

    According to“6 Potential Climate Change from Aviation” in IPCC (1999), CO 2 is, unlike ozone and water vapor perturbations, one of well-mixed gases, and there is small uncertainty in calculating radiative forcing (RF, a single measure of climate change defined by IPCC, which calculates the global annual average of radiative imbalance (W/m2) to the atmosphere-land-ocean system caused by anthropogenic perturbations and sets the RF of preindustrial atmosphere to be zero). Still the RF for aviation CO 2 in 1992 based on NASA-1992 aviation scenario, for example, is estimated to be +0.018(W/m2) with a likely range of ±30 % that includes uncertainties in the carbon cycle and in radiative calculations for a fixed amount of fuel burn (160.3(million tons/year)) and a fixed CO 2 concentration level (1.0 ppmv). Also, while the persistent linear contrails have relatively small impact on the environment, other spreading types of contrail from global aviation have no best estimates of their effects on cirrus cloudiness. Global effect of aviation aerosol on background cloudiness remains unknown according to IPCC report (IPCC 2007b).

  10. 10.

    The uncertainty here is only one dimension. The structure, however, can be extended to multidimension uncertainties without loss of generality.

  11. 11.

    CARA utility function has the general form V = A1 + A2 exp{−ηc}, with η indicating coefficient of absolute risk aversion, i.e., degree of risk aversion. We can arbitrarily set the value A1 and A2. In the following case, we use A1 = 0 and A2 = −1 for simplicity.

    Although, in this case, the welfare function returns a negative value, we can interpret this negative welfare value as the difference from the highest welfare value, for example.

    A1 and A2 could be considered as the location adjusting parameter and scale parameter, respectively, for the CARA utility function.

  12. 12.

    According to sensitivity analysis, the more a 1 and a 2 are different, the more bargaining frontier spread. This means more room for the two countries to bargain. If these parameters are closer, the bargaining frontier is getting tighter. This means less room for the two countries to bargain.

  13. 13.

    The bargaining model is theoretically founded in Nash (1950).

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Correspondence to Katsuya Hihara .

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Hihara, K. (2017). The Role of Aviation in Climate Change Mitigation. In: Chen, WY., Suzuki, T., Lackner, M. (eds) Handbook of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14409-2_60

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