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Using Fixed-Price Auctions for Selection in Communities of Web Services

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 8697))

Abstract

This paper introduces an approach that allows Web services to handle user requests where the price that the users are willing to pay is fixed. In such cases, a user search for the highest quality of service based on the submitted fixed price. Instead of searching for individual Web services, the user finds it more convenient to send requests to middlemen (or brokers) who act on behalf of a group of Web services. These middlemen then select a Web service within the group to handle the request. In this paper we demonstrate how fixed price requests can be included into the operation of a community of Web services. Our approach introduces auction theory into the selection process. Experiments using real world values are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach.

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Lim, E., Maamar, Z. (2014). Using Fixed-Price Auctions for Selection in Communities of Web Services. In: Parsons, J., Chiu, D. (eds) Advances in Conceptual Modeling. ER 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8697. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14139-8_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14139-8_21

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-14138-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-14139-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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