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Secure Modular Password Authentication for the Web Using Channel Bindings

  • Mark Manulis
  • Douglas Stebila
  • Nick Denham
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8893)

Abstract

Secure protocols for password-based user authentication are well-studied in the cryptographic literature but have failed to see wide-spread adoption on the Internet; most proposals to date require extensive modifications to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, making deployment challenging. Recently, a few modular designs have been proposed in which a cryptographically secure password-based mutual authentication protocol is run inside a confidential (but not necessarily authenticated) channel such as TLS; the password protocol is bound to the established channel to prevent active attacks. Such protocols are useful in practice for a variety of reasons: security no longer relies on users’ ability to validate server certificates and can potentially be implemented with no modifications to the secure channel protocol library.

We provide a systematic study of such authentication protocols. Building on recent advances in modelling TLS, we give a formal definition of the intended security goal, which we call password-authenticated and confidential channel establishment (PACCE). We show generically that combining a secure channel protocol, such as TLS, with a password authentication protocol, where the two protocols are bound together using either the transcript of the secure channel’s handshake or the server’s certificate, results in a secure PACCE protocol. Our prototype based on TLS is available as a cross-platform client-side Firefox browser extension and a server-side web application which can easily be installed on deployed web browsers and servers.

Keywords

password authentication Transport Layer Security channel binding 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark Manulis
    • 1
  • Douglas Stebila
    • 2
  • Nick Denham
    • 2
  1. 1.Surrey Centre for Cyber SecurityUniversity of SurreyUK
  2. 2.Queensland University of TechnologyBrisbaneAustralia

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