Introduction

Abstract

As economic globalization and free trade agreements make national economies more interconnected, business issues increasingly cross-affect more jurisdictions and nations. While trading systems expand at the international level, national courts are gradually more exposed to litigation involving international trade rules at the domestic level, increasingly in areas that involves domestic regulation and public policy. The relations between international law and domestic law have become more intricate, resulting in domestic judges being prompted to adjudicate on domestic litigation involving international treaties. The theoretical debate that contours the attitudes of domestic courts towards international trade law raises a primary question, that is, what should be the proper role of domestic judges regarding international law? Consider that the major economies of the world trade system, such as the United States, the European Union, Canada, Japan, China, South Africa and India do not allow domestic courts to review the validity of governmental policies by private parties based on the WTO agreements. Or, in the international trade parlance, these major economies do not give direct effect to WTO agreements. On the other hand, Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, give direct effect to WTO agreements. From these contrasting patterns, this study aims to explore the role of domestic courts in international trade agreements, by analyzing real cases and issues at work in domestic litigation involving the GATT and the Antidumping Agreements in the European Union and Brazil, and drawing lessons from their experiences.