Concluding on Biopsychosocial Essences

  • Ian Rory OwenEmail author
Part of the Contributions To Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 79)


This chapter sketches how the three registers of the biopsychosocial whole of human being fit together when consciousness is made central. It makes links to the current state of empirical psychology to show how consciousness can represent any object and act as a reminder that knowledge is primarily inside consciousness. The chapter links pure psychology to its potential uses in empirical psychologies and practices that would place consciousness and meaning-objects in social embededness and intentional forms, at the centre of professional discourses and the manifestation of their aims. The first section below provides an overview of consciousness in empathic connection with other consciousness (that is covered in detail below). The main focus of the chapter is making links to contemporary human biology from the perspective of the pure psychology of the ontology of the lifeworld which is justificatory intentional analysis for understanding the regions of spirit and nature, consciousness and körper. Thus, intentionality, ego, intersubjectivity and meaning constitution are explained. Husserl believed that there is a multifactorial biopsychosocial causation operating: “Causality is a relation between one reality and its corrective surrounding realities. But the reality of the spirit is not related to real circumstances residing within nature; rather, it is related to real circumstances that exist in the surrounding world and in other spirits: this, however, is not nature”, (IV, 283). The major topics below are focusing on biopsychosocial wholism by contacting biological received wisdom and making brief introductory statements of some of the contemporary perspectives that reinvent Husserl’s wheel when it comes to intersubjectivity and empathy, motivation, belief, desire and similar intentional wholes in the social world, the “web of immanent motivations” is where people literally share the same felt-aspirations when they are members of the same culture (IV, 226). Ineinander, intentional implication or intertwining, is used to describe how the meaningful connections between one person get added to another (IX, 9, VI, 256–257).


Psychological causation Naturalistic cause Natural being Physical conditions of possibility Culture Lifeworld Cultural object Cultural sense Cultural intersubjective world Lifeworld Lebenswelt Cultural world Social context Motive Motivational or intentional ‘cause’ Intersubjective intentional implication Cultural conditioning Conditions of possibility of meaningfulness Phenomenological anthropology 

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Leeds and York Partnerships NHS Foundation TrustLeedsUnited Kingdom

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