Abstract
In real life, it is difficult to hold some assumptions of the classic game theory. For example, when a player of a game chooses a strategy, it should consider not only payoff from taking the strategy and others’ best responses, but also its goal and belief about others, which are normally private in real life. However, in game theory they are assumed “common knowledge” among players. To address the problem, this paper proposes a game model that allows the private goals and beliefs of players, which are represented in propositional formulae in order to specify reasoning procedures that the players choose their strategies in a game. Moreover, we reveal how players’ private goals and beliefs influence the outcomes of their game. Finally, we examplify how our model can be used to effectively explain an interesting game.
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Wu, G., Luo, X., Zhong, Q. (2014). A Game Model with Private Goal and Belief. In: Pham, DN., Park, SB. (eds) PRICAI 2014: Trends in Artificial Intelligence. PRICAI 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8862. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13560-1_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13560-1_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
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