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Preferences and Coalitions

  • Thomas Kämpke
  • Franz Josef Radermacher
Chapter
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 679)

Abstract

Redistribution of income is assumed to require the vote of at least 50 % of all individuals with income and each of them insists to be a winner from the redistribution. When inequality is to be increased in the interest of some, coalition partners must be found by compensation schemes. Compensation minimization is shown to lead to coalition partners being either a connected or a disconnected income group. When inequality reaches certain critical levels, disconnection becomes unavoidable. For one-parametric income distributions, the critical levels are denoted as bifurcation points.

Values of bifurcation points are computed numerically for several one-parametric distributions. For income distributions with two or more parameters the bifurcation point is replaced by a bifurcation function.

Keywords

Loss Function Income Distribution Pareto Distribution Lorenz Curve Bifurcation Parameter 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Kämpke
    • 1
  • Franz Josef Radermacher
    • 2
  1. 1.Research Institute for Applied Knowledge Processing (FAW/n)UlmGermany
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of UlmUlmGermany

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