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Forming an Evolutionarily Stable Firm Strategy Under Cournot Competition Using Social Preferences

Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS,volume 469)

Abstract

The paper investigates what kinds of firms’ social preferences (egoists, altruists or punishers) prove to be evolutionarily stable strategies under Cournot competition in the market of homogeneous product. Combining the traditional and evolutionary approaches to competition we define the conditions that forecast the attitude and profit dynamics of competitors under Cournot competition and adaptive behavior of rivals.

Keywords

  • Evolutionarily stable strategies
  • Institutions
  • Mechanisms
  • Social preferences
  • Experiment

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  • DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-13206-8_17
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Kobets, V., Poltoratskiy, M. (2014). Forming an Evolutionarily Stable Firm Strategy Under Cournot Competition Using Social Preferences. In: Ermolayev, V., Mayr, H., Nikitchenko, M., Spivakovsky, A., Zholtkevych, G. (eds) Information and Communication Technologies in Education, Research, and Industrial Applications. ICTERI 2014. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 469. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13206-8_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13206-8_17

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

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