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Sampling and Representation Complexity of Revenue Maximization

  • Shaddin Dughmi
  • Li Han
  • Noam Nisan
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8877)

Abstract

We consider (approximate) revenue maximization in mechanisms where the distribution on input valuations is given via “black box” access to samples from the distribution. We analyze the following model: a single agent, m outcomes, and valuations represented as m-dimensional vectors indexed by the outcomes and drawn from an arbitrary distribution presented as a black box. We observe that the number of samples required – the sample complexity – is tightly related to the representation complexity of an approximately revenue-maximizing auction. Our main results are upper bounds and an exponential lower bound on these complexities. We also observe that the computational task of “learning” a good mechanism from a sample is nontrivial, requiring careful use of regularization in order to avoid over-fitting the mechanism to the sample. We establish preliminary positive and negative results pertaining to the computational complexity of learning a good mechanism for the original distribution by operating on a sample from said distribution.

Keywords

Representation Complexity Full Version Revenue Maximization Good Mechanism Optimal Auction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shaddin Dughmi
    • 1
  • Li Han
    • 1
  • Noam Nisan
    • 2
  1. 1.University of Southern CaliforniaUSA
  2. 2.Hebrew University and Microsoft ResearchUSA

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