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The Beginning of Energy Cooperation Between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece

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The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation
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Abstract

One of the most important reasons for the Israeli–Greek rapprochement had to do with energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, which was integrally related to the new natural gas findings in Israel and Cyprus at a time of European energy dependence on Russia. Discussions quickly ensued in Nicosia and Jerusalem, concerning plans and options aiming to exploit and export at least part of this energy wealth. As will be shown in some detail, Israeli–Cypriot cooperation involved historic political visits, improved economic relations, and, above all, close coordination on energy matters. The rapprochement was also widely supported by the peoples of Cyprus. During the same period, tensions were rapidly rising in the region. As relations between Ankara and Jerusalem continued to deteriorate, Turkey even hinted at military action to stop Cypriot energy-related plans. Nevertheless, Ankara ultimately failed to block plans by either Cyprus or Israel. Importantly, Greece also joined Israeli–Cypriot energy plans. Based on interviews with Greek decision makers at the highest possible levels of power, this chapter explains how by summer 2012, an “energy triangle” between Athens, Jerusalem, and Nicosia was gradually put into place. It included plans to construct an electricity cable linking all three states, as well as discussions about the building of a pipeline to export the newly found natural gas deposits to Europe via Greece.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See also the comprehensive analysis in Rao (2012) as well as Yergin (2011, April 11).

  2. 2.

    “By 2040, [Exxon] expects natural gas consumption to rise 65 %, but coal use to be no higher than it is today, rising and then falling again during the next two decades” (Crocks 2013, December 12).

  3. 3.

    A word of caution, however, should be included in these euphoric predictions. To quote David G. Victor: “The history of exuberance, despair, and error by the best [energy] forecasters is a warning that much can change in unpredictable ways” (Victor 2013, p. 94).

  4. 4.

    See also Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy (2010, p. 34).

  5. 5.

    The estimate quoted in the main text is “the mean projection of a range between 12,400 TCF (with a 90 % probability of being exceeded) and 20,800 TCF (with a 10 % probability of being exceeded). The mean projection is 150 times the annual consumption of 108 TCF in 2009” (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Initiative, 2010, p. 7).

  6. 6.

    See Alter and Fishman (2014, April 27); Bremmer and Hersh (2013, May 22); Deutch, (2011, pp. 89–92); The Economist (2013, June 29); Leigh and Brandsma (2012); Mann (2013, pp. 60–61); and Victor (2013, pp. 99–101).

  7. 7.

    It should be mentioned, however, that the creation of a single global market with a single price in the future is not necessarily an impossible scenario. See Deutch (2011, p. 83).

  8. 8.

    Natural gas is also considered as being “only half as bad for climate change as coal” (Levi 2013, p. 97).

  9. 9.

    On fracking, see especially National Intelligence Council (2012, p. 37) and Yergin (2012, p. 329–334). For an appreciation of George Mitchell, who is probably the person most responsible for making the technique of fracking viable and efficient, see Schumpeter (2013 August 3) and Yergin (2012, pp. 327–331). A satisfying and primarily celebratory account of the key businesspeople behind the fracking revolution can be found in Zuckerman (2013). For a balanced assessment of the environmental issues involved, see Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Initiative (2010, pp. 14–16). See also the reasonable observations in Levi (2012, pp. 45–46). Methane leakage is quite possibly the most significant environmental danger associated with fracking. See Nocera (2013, November 18). The interplay of fracking’s international and environmental implications are adequately discussed in Dröge and Westphal (2013). For examples of the debate over fracking in the USA, Epstein (2013) see Orden (2013, August 26); Gang (2013, September 6); Wines (2013, November 18); and Krupp (2014). On China’s approach to the momentous developments on the natural gas front, see Spegele and Spegele and Scheck (2013, September 5). For developments and strategies more generally in Asia, see Harlan (2013, October 15).

  10. 10.

    See Bipartisan Policy Center and American Clean Skies Foundation (2011, p. 2) and Gold and Gilbert (2013, October 3)

  11. 11.

    See International Energy Agency (2012b, November 12) and Forbes. (2012, November 12). The 2012 report by the U.S. National Intelligence Council predicts energy independence "in as short a period as 10–20 years" (National Intelligence Council 2012, p. 36). However, the USA will consume rather than export most of its energy. See Mann (2013, p. 54). See also the excellent, balanced, and sophisticated analyses of the energy-related developments and consequences in the USA in Levi (2013). An energy-independent USA that depends primarily on natural gas will likely also affect the use of nuclear power. See The Economist (2013, June 1). It is also worth noting that for the first time in 18 years, it was estimated that in October 2013, the USA was producing more crude oil than it was importing. See Makan (2013, November 14).

  12. 12.

    Based on Dr. Nikolaos Farantouris’ lecture on “Strategic Competition in the Energy Sector in the Eastern Mediterranean,” delivered on 29 April 2013 at New York University’s Remarque Institute.

  13. 13.

    Dr. Nikolaos Farantouris, “Strategic Competition in the Energy Sector in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Lecture delivered on 29 April 2013 at New York University’s Remarque Institute.

  14. 14.

    See also Noël (2013, pp. 176–177) and Scaroni (2013, October 31). Not coincidentally, “France has banned fracking entirely, and Germany has put a de facto moratorium in place” (Hefner 2014, p. 13). For examples of how European states and local communities in England, Germany and the Netherlands are grappling with the debate over whether to proceed with fracking, see Birnbaum (2013, April 25); Reed (2013b, May 24); Blackburn (2013, July 20); Cameron (2013, August 11); Cohen (2013, August 26); Steinglass (2013, August 27); and Mason (2014, July 27). Europe’s somewhat confused energy policy and approach towards fracking is explained persuasively in Glover (2013, June 3).

  15. 15.

    See also Butler (2013, April 5) on the issues and complications relating to Lebanon’s E.E.Z. See the analysis in Lakes (2012).

  16. 16.

    The Greek press widely reported that this estimate was related to US President Barack Obama by Prime Minister Antonis Samaras during his official visit to the White House on 8 August 2013. See for example Terzis (2013, August 11). These reports were never denied and were also confirmed to the author by high-level Greek diplomatic sources.

  17. 17.

    See Knell (2013, May 13).

  18. 18.

    The announcement was made on 28 December 2011. See also Leventis (2012, p. 8) and Reed (2013a, April 5).

  19. 19.

    See Philenews (2013, September 12). According to the President of the Cyprus National Hydrocarbons Company (CNHC) Charalambos Ellinas, “by 2025, Cyprus could be in a position to export 25 million tons of liquefied gas (35 BCM), beginning with 5 million tons (7 BCM) by 2020. This could increase to 35 million tons (50 BCM) if Vasilliko becomes a hub for liquefied natural gas in the region” (Ibid).

  20. 20.

    Preliminary estimates for the total worth of Cyprus’ energy reserves stood at $ 400 billion (Kariotis 2011, p. 48).

  21. 21.

    Philenews. (2013, October 3). The mean is 5 TCF, ’Aphrodite’ 30  % smaller-plans for a terminal unchanged. http://www.philenews.com/el-gr/oikonomia-kypros/146/164792/30-pio-mikro-to-afroditi-den-allazoun-oi-schediasmoi-gia-termatiko Accessed 4 October 2013 (in Greek).

  22. 22.

    See Tsalakos, K. Y. (2013, December 18). Oil [worth] 60 bill. euros for Cyprus. Ta Nea, http://www.tanea.gr/news/economy/article/5065992/petrelaio-60-dis-gia-thn-kypro/ Accessed 18 December 2013 (in Greek).

  23. 23.

    The estimate was made on the basis of 2010 prices. See Gordon (2011) and Bar-Eli (2010b, December 30).

  24. 24.

    See World Oil (2013, March 6).

  25. 25.

    See Reuters (2014, July 13).

  26. 26.

    All figures are taken from Henderson (2012, p. 6).

  27. 27.

    Israel may also be able to count on the “onshore development of more than 260 billion barrels of oil to be developed from shale formations in the Shfela basin.” See Gordon (2011).

  28. 28.

    See Tsalakos (2013, December 18).

  29. 29.

    See the US State Department unclassified diplomatic cable titled, Cyprus to auction off exploration rights for possible offshore oil and gas deposits, 11 August 2006. (Reference ID 06NICOSIA1361) published at www.wikileaks.com. Accessed 15 May 2013.

  30. 30.

    US State Department confidential diplomatic cable titled Cyprus oil and gas licensing rights challenged by Turkey. Accessed 8 February 2007. (Reference ID 07NICOSIA120) published at www.wikileaks.com. Accessed 15 May 2013.

  31. 31.

    The agreement with Egypt was “the first such delimitation agreement in the Eastern Mediterranean” (Giamouridis 2012, p. 14). The Lebanon agreement has yet to be ratified by the country’s parliament and has thus never come into force. Lebanon also objected to the Cyprus–Israel agreement. To understand Lebanon’s position in its maritime dispute with Israel (a state with which it is technically still at war), see Lakes (2012) and Wählisch (2011). Some significant objections have also been raised by Egypt’s upper House of Parliament about its DMA with Cyprus. See Today’s Zaman (2013, March 8). It should also be mentioned that in September 2011, Turkey signed a DMA with the unrecognized, self-declared “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.” For a useful overview of maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean, see Scovazzi (2012).

  32. 32.

    Dr. Petros Liacouras, “Exclusive Economic Zones in the Eastern Mediterranean: Developments and Prospects.” Lecture delivered on 29 April 2013 at New York University’s Remarque Institute.

  33. 33.

    This was made abundantly clear to the author by Greek and Israeli officials when discussing the reason Israel and Cyprus delimited their EEZs. It also emerges from US diplomatic documents that Noble Energy officials made such a request, since as far back as August 2007 they had considered that “an outstanding issue…[was] the lack of a treaty demarcating the boundary between the Israeli and Cypriot EEZs.” (US State Department unclassified diplomatic cable titled Few Bids for Exploring Offshore Cyprus, 17 August 2007 (Reference ID 07NICOSIA675) published at www.wikileaks.com. Accessed 15 May 2013. Influenced by Cyprus’ experience, a debate (with a rather surprising intellectual ferocity) erupted in Greece on whether the country should allow suit and declare its own EEZ. Eschewing polemics and philippics, the proper parameters of this debate are presented in Kariotis (2007), Tsaltas (2012), and Tzimitras (2012). For the most comprehensive and sophisticated analysis, see Mazis and Sgouros (2013).

  34. 34.

    On this point, see its explicit acceptance in the US State Department confidential diplomatic cable titled Cyprus Oil and Gas Licensing Rights Challenged by Turkey, 8 February 2007 (Reference ID 07NICOSIA120) published at www.wikileaks.com. Accessed 15 May 2013.

  35. 35.

    Cypriot and Greek officials who talked to the author were utterly convinced that this is the case, though no evidence was presented.

  36. 36.

    See the US State Department unclassified diplomatic cable titled “Few Bids for Exploring Offshore Cyprus,” 17 August 2007 (Reference ID 07NICOSIA675) published at www.wikileaks.com. Accessed 15 May 2013.

  37. 37.

    US State Department confidential diplomatic cable titled “Cyprus to Announce Tenders for Offshore Exploration, Severe Turkish Negative Reaction Expected,” October 10 2008 (Reference ID 08NICOSIA811) published at www.wikileaks.com.

  38. 38.

    See the US State Department unclassified diplomatic cable titled Few Bids for Exploring Offshore Cyprus, 17 August 2007 (Reference ID 07NICOSIA675) published at www.wikileaks.com. Accessed 15 May 2013.

  39. 39.

    See US State Department confidential diplomatic cable titled “Cyprus: Regional Benefits from Natural Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean—Noble activity moving ahead,” 29 July 2009 (Reference ID 09NICOSIA488) published at www.wikileaks.com. Accessed 15 May 2013.

  40. 40.

    The ‘‘TNRC’’ unilaterally and rather surprisingly declared independence on November 15, 1983. See (Ker-Lindsay 2011, pp. 51–52).

  41. 41.

    Israel is also not an UNCLOS signatory state.

  42. 42.

    Based on author’s interviews and discussions at the time. See also Antoniou (2011a, August 7).

  43. 43.

    See Antoniou (2011b, August 14).

  44. 44.

    See also Ta Nea (2011b, September 9) and Papapostolou 2011. For further negative reactions towards Turkey by Baroness Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as well as by the European People’s Party (EEP), see Giamouridis (2012, p. 32).

  45. 45.

    See also Enet (2011, August 22).

  46. 46.

    U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing, 9 September 2011. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2011/09/172061.htm Accessed 15 September, 2011. Nuland went on to say that, ‘‘We’ve also made clear that we believe that the energy resources ought to be equally shared’’ (ibid.; emphasis added). The latter statement created anxiety and concern in both Nicosia and Athens, since an equal distribution of revenues among numerically unequal communities was seen, at the very least, as unfair. However, as Greek diplomats always point out, the U.S. position was soon “corrected” to that of support for the “equitable” sharing of energy-related wealth in Cyprus. See Greeknewsonline (2011, October 3). On the issue of U.S. support for Cyprus’ energy exploration and exploitation see also Antoniou (2011c, August 18); Bekiaris (2011, August 20); and Pollatos (2011, August 21).

  47. 47.

    For an excellent and succinct overview of Israeli–Cypriot relations, see Stergiou (2013, pp. 495–496).

  48. 48.

    See Golan (2011, March 11).

  49. 49.

    In addition to energy and tourism, bilateral cooperation was also discussed concerning the area of health.

  50. 50.

    See Sigmalive (2011, August 24).

  51. 51.

    See Ploutarchos (2011, February 13).

  52. 52.

    The President of the Hellenic Republic, Karolos Papoulias, reiterated some 2 weeks later Athens’ intentions to be fully supportive of Cyprus. See Ethnos (2011b September 30).

  53. 53.

    See Arsu and Cowell (2011, September 2); Bronner and Arsu (2011, September 11); Kirkpatrick (2011, September 9); Bronner (2011, September 12); and Fox News (2011, September 12)

  54. 54.

    See Onalert.gr (2011, September 16).

  55. 55.

    See Defencegreece (2011, September 14).

  56. 56.

    See Globes-online (2011, September 16) and Giamouridis (2012, pp. 18–19).

  57. 57.

    See Athanasopoulos (2011a, September 15).

  58. 58.

    This was widely understood in Athens to be the case. However, the expectation was that Turkey would ultimately fail to get any real results by threatening military action. See, for example, Antoniou (2011d, October 2).

  59. 59.

    See To Vima. (2011a, September 26).

  60. 60.

    See Ellis (2011b, October 29).

  61. 61.

    See Udasin (2011, September 22).

  62. 62.

    See also Haaretz. (2011, September 30).

  63. 63.

    See The Jerusalem Post (2011, September 27) and The Jerusalem Post (2011c, September 30).

  64. 64.

    See The Jerusalem Post. (2011d, September 30) and Ynetnews (2011, September 30). It is also noteworthy that, in May 2012, Ankara protested the violation of what it considers to be the TNRC’s airspace by an Israeli military plane. See The Jerusalem Post (2012, May 18).

  65. 65.

    See Gordon (2011) and Antoniou (2011e, October 9)

  66. 66.

    See Chasapopoulos (2011, September 17).

  67. 67.

    According to reports, the following companies were contemplating bids: Shell, Gazprom, Total, Gaz de France, Chevron, and Statoil. See Tsangkari (2011, October 2). For the full list of the companies and consortia that eventually submitted bids, see Giamouridis (2012, pp. 23–24).

  68. 68.

    See In.gr (2011, October 20).

  69. 69.

    In August 2013, reports emerged that the Russian government was interested in obtaining certain privileges in the Andreas Papandreou Pafos Airbase. The chances of any Cypriot government granting such access to Moscow are extremely slim. See Kathimerini. (2013, August 18).

  70. 70.

    See EKirikas.com (2012, February 2).

  71. 71.

    See Kathimerini (2012, May 2).

  72. 72.

    To provide an illustration of this point, when Foreign Minister Lieberman visited Cyprus in April 2012, military cooperation was not part of his official agenda according to various sources. Revealingly, he had no meeting with Cyprus’ Minister of Defense Demetris Eliades.

  73. 73.

    See Defencepoint.gr (2011, November 3); Naftemporiki (2011, November 2); and Ta Nea (2011c, November 4).

  74. 74.

    See Aggelioforos (2011, November 8).

  75. 75.

    Iefimerida.gr (2011, November 14).

  76. 76.

    These comments were made while Christofias was speaking at the United Nations in New York.

  77. 77.

    See Cyprus.gov.cy (2011, November 21).

  78. 78.

    To Vima (2011b, December 10).

  79. 79.

    See EuropeanBusiness.gr (2011, December 28) and Ethnos (2011c, December 29).

  80. 80.

    See Katz (2011, October 16) and Katz (2012b, April 10).

  81. 81.

    This development was noticed by several shrewd experts. For example, see Morris (2012, February 2).

  82. 82.

    See Luft (2010, June 6); Pelone (2010, August 21/22); and Bar-Eli (2010a, August 29).

  83. 83.

    See Israel Diplomatic Netwrok (2011, November 22).

  84. 84.

    See Udasin (2012, March 4).

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Tziampiris, A. (2015). The Beginning of Energy Cooperation Between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. In: The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12604-3_7

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