A Performance Analysis of ARM Virtual Machines Secured Using SELinux

Conference paper
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 470)


Virtualization of the ARM architecture is becoming increasingly popular in several domains. Thus security is one of the main concerns in modern virtualized embedded platforms. An effective way to enhance the security of these platforms is through a combination of virtualization and Mandatory Access Control (MAC) security policies. The aim of this paper is to discuss the performance overhead of MAC-secured virtual machines. We compare the I/O performance of a KVM/ARM guest running on a SELinux host with the one of a non-secured VM. The result of the comparison is unexpected, since the performance of the SELinux based VM is better than the non-secured VM. We present a detailed analysis based on a modified version of SELinux running on an ARM core, and highlight the main causes of the observed performance improvement.


ARM virtualization SELinux KVM ARM VM security MAC virtual machines Mandatory access control (MAC) 



This research work has been supported by the FP7 TRESCCA project under the grant number 318036.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Virtual Open SystemsGrenobleFrance

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