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Beyond Trust

  • Partha Das ChowdhuryEmail author
  • Bruce Christianson
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8809)

Abstract

Risk as studied conventionally and risk as manifested in actuality differ widely both in semantics and content. In this paper we explore the possibility of managing risk without resorting to transitive and compulsive relationships termed as “trust”. We draw an exploitable analogy with the assumptions under which cooperation is observed in repeated strategic games and posit that voluntary cooperation between players with mutually incompatible commitments is indeed possible provided that such cooperation can be promiscuous.

Keywords

Strategic Game Side Payment Credible Threat Actuate Risk Latent Risk 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of HertfordshireHertfordshireUK

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