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Censorship Resistance as a Side-Effect

  • Henry Tan
  • Micah SherrEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8809)

Abstract

This position paper presents the following thought experiment: can we build communication protocols that (1) are sufficiently useful that they achieve widespread adoption as general-purpose communication mechanisms and (2) thwart censorship as a consequence of their design? We posit that a useful communication platform that is inherently resistant to traffic analysis, if widely adopted and used primarily for purposes not related to censorship circumvention, may be too politically and economically costly for a government to block.

Keywords

Covert Channel Communication Platform Centralize Architecture Rendezvous Point Privacy Enhance Technology 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work is partially supported by NSF CAREER CNS-1149832 and NSF grants CNS-1064986, CNS-1204347, and CNS-1223825. The findings and opinions described in this paper are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. Additionally, this material is based upon work supported by the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific under Contract No. N66001-11-C-4020. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Georgetown UniversityWashington, DCUSA

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