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Human Rights and Interpretation: Limits and Demands of Harmonizing Interpretation of International Law

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The Influence of Human Rights on International Law

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Abstract

The issue of interpretation in public international law (PIL) has in recent years drawn considerable scholarly attention. A particular focus has been to develop interpretative methods to ameliorate the fragmentation of public international law. Therefore, as human rights law and other specialized branches are mostly considered to belong to one overarching system of public international law, interpretation of human rights might be affected by those other branches.

This article is based on a presentation held at the Trinational Georgian–German–French Research Workshop “The Influence of Human Rights on International Law”, 5–7 September 2012. Therefore, the general style of an oral presentation has been kept and the number of references limited.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See as examples only Linderfalk (2010), Orakhelashvili (2008), and Gardiner (2008).

  2. 2.

    See, e.g., ILC and Koskenniemi (2006), paras 424 et seq.; Matz-Lück (2006), pp. 45 and 46; Pavoni (2010), pp. 651 et seq.

  3. 3.

    Even though this position is not universally held, it may safely be considered the most common understanding of PIL; see only ILC and Koskenniemi (2006), paras 192–194.

  4. 4.

    This term has been introduced most prominently to the theory of legal interpretation by Fish (1980), pp. 304 and 305.

  5. 5.

    ILC and Koskenniemi (2006), paras 410 et seq.

  6. 6.

    See Matz-Lück (2006), pp. 45–48; Pavoni (2010), pp. 651, 653, and 666–669.

  7. 7.

    See ILC and Koskenniemi (2006), para 479; Matz-Lück (2006), pp. 47 and 48; Pavoni (2010), p. 678.

  8. 8.

    See ILC and Koskenniemi (2006), paras 479–480; Pavoni (2010), p. 678.

  9. 9.

    See only ILC and Koskenniemi (2006), paras 424–460.

  10. 10.

    Originally ECtHR, Tyrer v. UK, No. 5856/72, para 31; in more detail see Rietiker (2010), pp. 260–268; Letsas (2010), pp. 263–266.

  11. 11.

    See Linderfalk (2011), pp. 148 et seq.; Dawidowicz (2011), pp. 205–208.

  12. 12.

    ICJ, Judgment of 13.07.2009, Dispute Regarding Certain Navigational Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), ICJ Reports 2009, p. 213, para 66; for a critical remark, cf. Dawidowicz (2011), pp. 219–222.

  13. 13.

    Rietiker (2010), pp. 262 and 263.

  14. 14.

    ILC (1966), p. 218.

  15. 15.

    Cf. the description of Kammerhofer (2011), pp. 88–92.

  16. 16.

    Orakhelashvili (2008), pp. 285–288; for a contraposition, see Kammerhofer (2011), pp. 104 et seq.

  17. 17.

    See for an extended reasoning from a Kelsenian perspective Kammerhofer (2011), pp. 106 et seq. and 117 et seq.

  18. 18.

    ILC and Koskenniemi (2006), para 34.

  19. 19.

    Kammerhofer (2011), pp. 117–120.

  20. 20.

    Kammerhofer (2011), p. 112.

  21. 21.

    Kammerhofer (2011), pp. 105–113.

  22. 22.

    This is a general feature of international law; see Pellet (2011), paras 35 et seq.; Gardiner (2008), p. 114, and confirmed by the statutes of most courts and tribunals, e.g., Art. 59 Statute of the International Court of Justice.

  23. 23.

    See only ILC and Koskenniemi (2006), para 427.

  24. 24.

    See the detailed account from Bernhardt (1967), pp. 492 and 493.

  25. 25.

    Fish (1980), pp. 303 et seq.; see also Johnstone (1990–1991), p. 378.

  26. 26.

    Fish (1984), pp. 1343; Johnstone (1990–1991), p. 379.

  27. 27.

    See the treatise of Fiss (1981–1982), pp. 741–744.

  28. 28.

    See on the debate between both scholars Fiss (1981–1982), pp. 744–750, and Fish (1984), pp. 1343 et seq.

  29. 29.

    Alexy (2001), pp. 299–307, establishes this link; cf. also Johnstone (2003), pp. 440–442.

  30. 30.

    See for the legal discourse Habermas (1998), pp. 151–165 and 272–292; Alexy (2001), pp. 233–254.

  31. 31.

    See for an overview of different theories Alexy (2001), pp. 53–218 and 221–254, for his own theory.

  32. 32.

    See for the conditions of the perfect discourse, e.g., Alexy (2001), pp. 141–161 and 233–258; also see Johnstone (2003), pp. 455 and 456, with further references.

  33. 33.

    Alexy (2001), pp. 307.

  34. 34.

    For the lawmaking practice, see Kammerhofer (2011), pp. 135–138.

  35. 35.

    See only Johnstone (2003), pp. 444 and 445.

  36. 36.

    See the persuasive treatise of Simma and Pulkowski (2006), p. 529 (with a thorough analysis pp. 495 et seq.), and ILC and Koskenniemi (2006), para. 152. The ECtHR confirmed this dependence on PIL; see Rietiker (2010), pp. 250 and 251.

  37. 37.

    Arguably, the ECtHR’s practice is already recognized in the general community as effective teleological interpretation; cf. Rietiker (2010), pp. 256–260; Tzevelekos (2009–2010), pp. 685–687.

  38. 38.

    See Rietiker (2010), p. 276; Letsas (2010), p. 263.

  39. 39.

    Tzevelekos (2009–2010), pp. 688 and 689; cf. also pp. 645–679 on how the ECtHR actually employs Art. 31(3)(c) VCLT.

  40. 40.

    Again, they might in practice partly converge, yet the thoughts remain valid in principle.

  41. 41.

    A similar stance is taken by Tzevelekos (2009–2010), pp. 689–690.

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  1. Bucerius Law School, Hamburg, Germany

    Julian Udich

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  1. Julian Udich
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  1. University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany

    Norman Weiß

  2. Université Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense, Nanterre la Défense, Hauts-de-Seine, France

    Jean-Marc Thouvenin

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Udich, J. (2015). Human Rights and Interpretation: Limits and Demands of Harmonizing Interpretation of International Law. In: Weiß, N., Thouvenin, JM. (eds) The Influence of Human Rights on International Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12021-8_4

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