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A Formal Definition of Protocol Indistinguishability and Its Verification Using Maude-NPA

  • Sonia Santiago
  • Santiago Escobar
  • Catherine Meadows
  • José Meseguer
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8743)

Abstract

Intuitively, two protocols \({\mathcal P}_1\) and \({\mathcal P}_2\) are indistinguishable if an attacker cannot tell the difference between interactions with \({\mathcal P}_1\) and with \({\mathcal P}_2\). In this paper we: (i) propose an intuitive notion of indistinguishability in Maude-NPA; (ii) formalize such a notion in terms of state unreachability conditions on their synchronous product; (iii) prove theorems showing how —assuming the protocol’s algebraic theory has a finite variant (FV) decomposition– these conditions can be checked by the Maude-NPA tool; and (iv) illustrate our approach with concrete examples. This provides for the first time a framework for automatic analysis of indistinguishability modulo as wide a class of algebraic properties as FV, which includes many associative-commutative theories of interest to cryptographic protocol analysis.

Keywords

Equational Theory Operational Semantic Variant Decomposition Cryptographic Protocol Attack State 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sonia Santiago
    • 1
  • Santiago Escobar
    • 1
  • Catherine Meadows
    • 2
  • José Meseguer
    • 3
  1. 1.DSIC-ELPUniversitat Politècnica de ValènciaSpain
  2. 2.Naval Research LaboratoryWashingtonUSA
  3. 3.University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUSA

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