π-Cipher: Authenticated Encryption for Big Data

  • Danilo Gligoroski
  • Hristina Mihajloska
  • Simona Samardjiska
  • Håkon Jacobsen
  • Rune Erlend Jensen
  • Mohamed El-Hadedy
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8788)

Abstract

In today’s world of big data and rapidly increasing telecommunications, using secure cryptographic primitives that are parallelizable and incremental is becoming ever more important design goal. π-Cipher is parallel, incremental, nonce based authenticated encryption cipher with associated data. It is designed with the special purpose of providing confidentiality and integrity for big data in transit or at rest. It has, as an option, a secret part of the nonce which provides noncemisuse resistance. The design involves operations of several solid cryptographic concepts such as the Encrypt-then-MAC principle, the XOR MAC scheme and the two-pass sponge construction. It contains parameters that can provide the functionality of tweakable block ciphers for authenticated encryption of data at rest. The security of the cipher relies on the core permutation function based on ARX (Addition, Rotation and XOR) operations. π-Cipher offers several security levels ranging from 96 to 256 bits.

Keywords

Authenticated encryption AEAD parallelizability incrementality nonce-misuse resistance sponge construction 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Danilo Gligoroski
    • 1
  • Hristina Mihajloska
    • 2
  • Simona Samardjiska
    • 1
    • 2
    • 4
  • Håkon Jacobsen
    • 1
    • 4
  • Rune Erlend Jensen
    • 3
  • Mohamed El-Hadedy
    • 1
  1. 1.ITEMNTNUTrondheimNorway
  2. 2.FCSE, ”Ss Cyril and Methodius” UniversitySkopjeRepublic of Macedonia
  3. 3.IDINTNUTrondheimNorway
  4. 4.Supported by the COINS ResearchSchool of Computer and Information SecurityTrondheimNorway

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