Skip to main content

Part of the book series: Ethics of Science and Technology Assessment ((ETHICSSCI,volume 43))

  • 665 Accesses

Abstract

Transdisciplinary science addresses problems of specifically practical concern that are raised by the general public or by politics. In this chapter we deal with “scientific expertise”, i.e., recommendations issued by scientists on problems that are relevant from an extra-scientific point of view. These recommendations are based on scientific knowledge, but directed at concrete problems. Expert recommendations address specific challenges and are expected to provide tailor-made proposals as to how to deal with these challenges. Scientific experts often give policy advice and draw on science for elaborating their recommendations. For instance, scientific experts decide about the efficacy of medical drugs or about the safety of tanning devices or cell phones (as the German radiation protection commission, the Strahlenschutzkommission, does). The usual self-understanding of scientific experts is that they bring scientific knowledge to bear on the particular case at hand. Expertise is often passed off as the mere tapping of the repository of knowledge or of simply applying scientific knowledge to experience.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Interview conducted with Günther Dietze, a former chairman of the Strahlenschutzkommission, on June 16, 2010.

  2. 2.

    The example is due to Matthias Kaiser, oral communication.

  3. 3.

    For epistemic virtues, cf. Sects. 2.2.1 and 3.1.

  4. 4.

    For the purposes of this study, intrapsychic interdisciplinarity should be understood as internalised interdisciplinary cooperation in the sense of assumption of internalized roles. This does not deny that there can be successful intrapsychic interdisciplinarity. Using the analogy with multilingualism and the problem of translation connected with it as an illustration, Quine’s thesis cannot be considered appropriate that the problem of translation could be circumvented through “settling down“ for “heimisch werden” (becoming a resident): “We now see a way, though costly, in which he can still accomplish radical translation of such sentences. He can settle down and learn the native language directly as an infant might” (Quine 1960, p. 47). The costs in this case would not only be too high, but the witticism of the division of labour would also be missing.

  5. 5.

    For determination of “great/small interdisciplinarity”, cf. Sect. 2.3.

  6. 6.

    In the end, neither the judgment of the interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary agent nor the judgment of the persons putting together an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary team can be eliminated. And, of course, it can also depend on the “chemistry” of the entire team which virtues have precedence for a person to be appointed to the team. This is where an irreducible holistic character appears, as is probably familiar to trainers and sport managers in the area of team sports.

  7. 7.

    The present discussion about virtues is thus to be understood in just the same way as the discussion of values in a pre-theoretical sense, i.e. remaining understandable in real life and, at the same time, neutral in regard to meta-ethical differences. At this point, it is important to point out a dual distinction: on the one hand, a differentiation has to be made between a virtue (as a disposition) and the concrete practice of it (as completion of an action). On the other hand, and in a crosswise relation to the differentiation between disposition and completion of an action, a differentiation has to be made between the virtues and the abilities of a participant. Qua dispositions, virtues are counted, on the one hand, among abilities (if this term is equated with dispositionality); on the other hand, the ability for mathematical competence and great retentiveness, for example, are not virtues (in contrast to patience or the ability to engage oneself with the thought process of a different discipline, for instance). The latter differentiation requires not only abandonment of the equation of abilities and dispositions and the use of a narrower meaning for “ability”, but also differentiating between abilities (in the narrower sense) and virtues. These issues are not able to be pursued further in our investigation, so we limit it to the following two points: first of all, it is conceded that there are also abilities relevant for interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity (perhaps the ability to acquire large amounts of data in a different discipline is one of these). And secondly, it should hold that virtues differ from abilities in that the practice of them is accompanied by positive evaluation of performance providing a valuable contribution to the specific cooperation.

  8. 8.

    Since the term “discipline” is used in a specified sense for determination of interdisciplinarity in our study, we differentiate strictly between discipline and profession—in contrast to the usual terminology in literature on interprofessionality. For this reason, mention is only made of professions in the typology, and not of representatives of different disciplines.

  9. 9.

    A special constellation results when interdisciplinary research cooperation is accompanied by ethical research or when an Ethical Board is established. Then the other disciplines are on equal terms with ethics (with exception of the special case when it is philosophers who are integrated in the cooperation). Perception of the contribution of ethics can take on different forms: as a counsellor, as a watchdog (for example, as stipulated in funding formats), as a fig-leaf, or as an orientation for discussion partners.

  10. 10.

    Alternatively, speaking of a consensual part of the problem can be given up and the situation also described as several problems originating from the original problem assumed, so that a differentiation can then be made between consensual and non-consensual problems. The strategy of pre-defined transdisciplinary specifications can, however, result in academia no longer addressing the social inquiry (the problem) since it is broken up into several different problems. If this process is not understandable for non-scientific addressees, the impression arises that academia is evading the transdisciplinary question or simply rejecting it; cf. also Quante (2012).

  11. 11.

    Such normative criticism of empirical social research with divided responsibilities has been formulated by Adorno, for example (cf. Demirovic 1999, pp. 757 ff.). The appealing task of differentiating general effects of divided responsibilities from the ones specific to interdisciplinary division of work cannot be pursued here.

  12. 12.

    Willingness to take up and accept this approach can certainly be considered as one of the cardinal virtues of interdisciplinarity.

  13. 13.

    In this context, the question also comes up of whether a representative of the so-called prevailing opinion in a discipline or rather someone holding more heterodox (or at least peripheral) position is selected, for example. This is relevant for recognition of the respective representative within the group (professional reputation), as well as for recognition of the results of the interdisciplinary cooperation by the academic community and society; cf. Sect. 2.3.

  14. 14.

    Engineering sciences can enter into any of the above listed constellations, whereby the aspects of technical feasibility and the goal of practical-technical implementation come into account (and thus an accompanying expansion or even shift in the approach to the problem and the goal).

  15. 15.

    Philology and the historical disciplines, as well as philosophy are usually counted among the “humanities”.

  16. 16.

    In this paper, it can remain undiscussed whether this conception is appropriate in the area of the natural sciences. Here, the only significant factor is that, in any case, rejection of this “realistic” intuition leads to a greater manifest difference between different disciplines or schools.

  17. 17.

    The same also holds true for the constellation of social sciences and natural sciences, however, or for the humanities and natural sciences.

  18. 18.

    Naturally, this does not hold in every instance, nor is it ruled out that representatives of other disciplines also have this flexibility and competence for adoption of perspectives.

  19. 19.

    For this would mean, namely, that representatives of the philosophical field would not be a part of the cooperating group; a similar, just as inadmissible result would occur if a representative of psychology questioned the contributions of the partners in the cooperation in regard to their psychological backgrounds or if a representative of sociology explained participants’ actions in relation to their social backgrounds.

  20. 20.

    There is a special problem between philosophy and the disciplines which did not emancipate themselves from it until the last century (for example, political science and sociology). Many different points of friction have resulted because, on the one hand, a demarcation setting them apart from philosophy still partially contributes strongly to the “identity” of these disciplines and, on the other hand, the issue of whether these disciplines are to take a purely explanatory or rather a normative direction has not been conclusively (nor uniformly) settled.

  21. 21.

    These elucidations are also enlightening for transdisciplinary requirements.

  22. 22.

    Divergent standards for dealing with probabilities and with the expectation of validity for claims and justifiability of ethical statements are a constantly bubbling source of misunderstanding, not only in the interdisciplinary context, but also in the transdisciplinary one; cf. Sect. 4.3.1.

  23. 23.

    It is exactly the process of acquiring an understanding of the problem of a different discipline that can be strenuous or even painful because (and so far as) it demands revision of one’s own understanding of the problem.

  24. 24.

    A differentiation must be made between this institutional trust and the personal trust of the participants in their cooperation partners. It is possible for these two dimensions of trust not to go hand in hand with one another, i.e. that a discipline is trusted, but not its concrete representatives; or, vice versa, that a person is trusted as a scholar although his discipline is met with structural distrust (the latter is only possible, however, up to a certain degree which is also determined by the internal plurality of the discipline in question). The relevance of personal trust as a factor not reducible to trust in the disciplines and the academic institutions also explains why interdisciplinary cooperation usually favours longer term and recurrent cooperation with the same participants.

  25. 25.

    In my opinion, research results from the area of interprofessionality can be used fruitfully; cf. D’Amour & Oandasan (2005), Malin & Morrow (2007) and Molyneux (2001).

  26. 26.

    This thematic focus is compatible with a number of meta-ethical structures and thus does not specify one particular virtue-ethical conception. Furthermore, our approach implies neither that each of the virtues discussed in the following is exclusively relevant for interdisciplinarity, nor that there is one specific list that is only applicable for interdisciplinarity. The careful philosophical systematization undertaken in this section serves solely for explication of the pattern according to which, for example, we implicitly make selections for appointment to an interdisciplinary study group and thus for better orientation (and justification of such decisions). General academic virtues (such as truthfulness and probity) or even general epistemic virtues connected with “knowledge sharing”, are thus required as part of the general framework, but not discussed separately here.

  27. 27.

    This means that interdisciplinary work usually cannot be a concern for novices in the discipline, i.e. for so-called junior researchers.

  28. 28.

    Occasionally, a representative of one discipline identifies herself with a different discipline regarded as especially successful or influential. This can be paraphrased as a type of “identification with the aggressor” and demonstrates the representative’s lack of disciplinary or evaluative self-confidence. The judgment handed down by the members of that representative’s own discipline in such a case is that no colleague of theirs had been noticed, which brings home the point succinctly.

  29. 29.

    This happens at the latest when the phase of accusations of blame has been surmounted and an analysis of the successful and especially unsuccessful cooperation takes its place.

  30. 30.

    This structural affinity is another factor contributing to the special role of philosophy in interdisciplinary cooperation which has already been discussed.

  31. 31.

    Such fascination can result from different sources (and always depends on the specifics of one’s own discipline). Exemplary are such different points as the presentation of causal clarification, the possibility of technical intervention, the visualization of processes, the ordering of phenomena into a social or historical context, the pursuit of conceptual questions, or even the mathematisation of complex connections.

  32. 32.

    “Evaluative” is used here as a generic term for ethical norms, virtues, and values.

  33. 33.

    In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let us mention again that this does not result in any strict distinction between general abilities and virtues; the rough rule of thumb should be that participants value their abilities based on their virtues positively. There could be a narrower and more specific demand for appreciation of these abilities with regard to their function of enabling or improving interdisciplinary cooperation.

  34. 34.

    One of the greatest obstacles for interdisciplinary projects which should result in a collective publication is generally known to be reaching an agreement in regard to the manner of quoting.

  35. 35.

    For a more extensive presentation of these dialectics from a philosophical perspective, cf. Quante (2011).

  36. 36.

    One of the conditions for the possibility of interdisciplinary cooperation in the first place is that the disciplines and their professional representatives extending the invitation recognize one another respectively as competent and relevant participants for the problem. Any discourse in regard to this condition (or questioning of it) should thus also not be regarded as a move in the chess game of interdisciplinary cooperation, but rather belongs in the forecourt.

  37. 37.

    The question of the extent to which rankings and other standards of the academic system can contribute to stabilization of this aspect of trust towards individual partners in cooperation (and are thus able to or should serve as criteria for the selection of participants) cannot be pursued here; cf. Sect. 2.3.

  38. 38.

    The act of earning respect by insisting on the relevance of one’s own discipline and also by claiming recognition (in the case of disregard) is, once again, a toy in the forecourt of interdisciplinary cooperation. The analogy to sports would, however, be misleading here because “respect” is also often “earned” there through overstepping rules, hardness, and foul play.

  39. 39.

    The following is limited to the interface between academics-in-society, with no differentiation here of the different participants in “society”. For the question of whether the so-called public, in whatever form, should participate actively in interdisciplinary cooperation (in whatever form), cf. Sect. 4.3.2.

  40. 40.

    This demand for neutrality, however, does not require denying a connection to purpose or goal in academic action in favour of strict detachment a “view-from-nowhere” although it will probably create gentle pressure in the direction of universality.

  41. 41.

    For a detailed stocktaking of interdisciplinary research, its management and institutionalising, see Frodeman at al. (2012).

  42. 42.

    http://www.gradschools.com/search-programs/campus-programs/interdisciplinary-studies/doctorate (on 5 Feb 2013).

  43. 43.

    http://igs.ntu.edu.sg/Pages/Home.aspx (on 5 Feb 2013).

  44. 44.

    http://www.dfg.de/en/research_funding/programmes/list/index.jsp?id=FOR (on 28 Feb. 2013).

  45. 45.

    C.f. Beck et al. (2004).

  46. 46.

    Full name: “Europäische Akademie zur Erforschung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler GmbH”. Since May 2014, the academy has been renamed as “EA European Academy of Technology and Innovation Assessment GmbH” due to its reframing.

  47. 47.

    Wording as of the academy’s former research programme “(http://www.ea-aw.org/fileadmin/downloads/Forschungsprogramme/FP_e_201110.pdf on 4 March 2013)”.

  48. 48.

    In contrast to that, purely technical approaches towards rationality in normative questions (Bush 1945) might give way for unwanted scientific paternalism.

  49. 49.

    See preface of its research report “Arbeitsgruppe Umweltstandards” (1992). The academy’s successor is the “Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities” which ties on the tradition of its precursor.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to C. F. Gethmann .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Gethmann, C.F. et al. (2015). Knowing and Acting. In: Interdisciplinary Research and Trans-disciplinary Validity Claims. Ethics of Science and Technology Assessment, vol 43. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11400-2_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11400-2_3

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-11399-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-11400-2

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics