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International Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks

SCN 2014: Security and Cryptography for Networks pp 1–20Cite as

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange

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Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 8642)

Abstract

We consider the notion of a non-interactive key exchange (NIKE). A NIKE scheme allows a party A to compute a common shared key with another party B from B’s public key and A’s secret key alone. This computation requires no interaction between A and B, a feature which distinguishes NIKE from regular (i.e., interactive) key exchange not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively.

Our first contribution is a formalization of NIKE protocols as ideal functionalities in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. As we will argue, existing NIKE definitions (all of which are game-based) do not support a modular analysis either of NIKE schemes themselves, or of the use of NIKE schemes. We provide a simple and natural UC-based NIKE definition that allows for a modular analysis both of NIKE schemes and their use in larger protocols.

We investigate the properties of our new definition, and in particular its relation to existing game-based NIKE definitions. We find that

(a) game-based NIKE security is equivalent to UC-based NIKE security against static corruptions, and

(b) UC-NIKE security against adaptive corruptions cannot be achieved without additional assumptions (but can be achieved in the random oracle model).

Our results suggest that our UC-based NIKE definition is a useful and simple abstraction of non-interactive key exchange.

Keywords

  • non-interactive key exchange
  • universal composability

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Royal Holloway, University of London, United Kingdom

    Eduarda S. V. Freire

  2. Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany

    Julia Hesse & Dennis Hofheinz

Authors
  1. Eduarda S. V. Freire
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  2. Julia Hesse
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  3. Dennis Hofheinz
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. École Normale Supérieure & CNRS, 45 rue d’Ulm, 75005, Paris, France

    Michel Abdalla

  2. Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di Salerno, via Ponte don Melillo, 84084, Fisciano, Italy

    Roberto De Prisco

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Freire, E.S.V., Hesse, J., Hofheinz, D. (2014). Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange. In: Abdalla, M., De Prisco, R. (eds) Security and Cryptography for Networks. SCN 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8642. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-10878-0

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