Abstract
We consider the notion of a non-interactive key exchange (NIKE). A NIKE scheme allows a party A to compute a common shared key with another party B from B’s public key and A’s secret key alone. This computation requires no interaction between A and B, a feature which distinguishes NIKE from regular (i.e., interactive) key exchange not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively.
Our first contribution is a formalization of NIKE protocols as ideal functionalities in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. As we will argue, existing NIKE definitions (all of which are game-based) do not support a modular analysis either of NIKE schemes themselves, or of the use of NIKE schemes. We provide a simple and natural UC-based NIKE definition that allows for a modular analysis both of NIKE schemes and their use in larger protocols.
We investigate the properties of our new definition, and in particular its relation to existing game-based NIKE definitions. We find that
(a) game-based NIKE security is equivalent to UC-based NIKE security against static corruptions, and
(b) UC-NIKE security against adaptive corruptions cannot be achieved without additional assumptions (but can be achieved in the random oracle model).
Our results suggest that our UC-based NIKE definition is a useful and simple abstraction of non-interactive key exchange.
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Freire, E.S.V., Hesse, J., Hofheinz, D.: Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange. Cryptology ePrint Archive (2014), http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/528
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Freire, E.S.V., Hesse, J., Hofheinz, D. (2014). Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange. In: Abdalla, M., De Prisco, R. (eds) Security and Cryptography for Networks. SCN 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8642. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_1
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