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Arrow’s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

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The Mathematics of Elections and Voting

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Abstract

In many voting systems, each voter must produce a ranked preference order of all candidates mentioned, and no ties are allowed. Such systems are called ordinal . However some voting systems, called cardinal , allow the voters to evaluate candidates separately, and a voter could say two candidates were equal. For the moment we shall concentrate on ordinal systems; cardinal systems will be studied in Chap. 7.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Southern Illinois University, Evansville, IN, USA

    W. D. Wallis

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  1. W. D. Wallis
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Wallis, W.D. (2014). Arrow’s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. In: The Mathematics of Elections and Voting. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09810-4_5

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