Arrow’s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

  • W. D. Wallis


In many voting systems, each voter must produce a ranked preference order of all candidates mentioned, and no ties are allowed. Such systems are called ordinal . However some voting systems, called cardinal , allow the voters to evaluate candidates separately, and a voter could say two candidates were equal. For the moment we shall concentrate on ordinal systems; cardinal systems will be studied in Chap.  7.


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© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • W. D. Wallis
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of MathematicsSouthern Illinois UniversityEvansvilleUSA

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